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Abstract
In the post-WWII era, most developing economies had decent economic growth, but,
with current growth trends, the great majority of them are unlikely to transform into
developed economies in near future. In these economies, the dual economic structure, the
coexistence of the modern/formal sector and the traditional/informal sector, is persistent.
The educational level of the population increased greatly, but the growth of the skill level,
especially when measured by the share of high-skill workers, is relatively modest. Wage
inequality between workers with basic skills and with advanced skills rose over time, while
the inequality between workers with and without basic skills fell greatly.
In order to understand these facts, this paper develops a dynamic dual-economy model
and examines how the long-run outcome of the economy depends on the initial distribu-
tion of wealth and sectoral productivity. It is shown that, for fast transformation into
a developed economy, the initial distribution must be such that extreme poverty is not
prevalent and the size of ”middle class” is enough. If the former is satisﬁed but the latter
is not, which would be the case for many developing economies falling into ”middle income
trap”, the fraction of workers with basic skills and the share of the modern sector rise,
but inequality between workers with advanced skills and with basic skills worsens and the
traditional sector remains, consistent with the above-mentioned facts.
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1 Introduction
In the post-WWII era, most developing economies had decent economic growth and raised
standards of living reasonably. However, except some oil-rich economies, only a small number
of economies in East Asia and Southern Europe had persistent high growth and evolved into
developed economies. With current income levels and growth trends, the great majority of
developing economies are unlikely to achieve such transformation in near future.
In these economies, the dual economic structure, that is, the coexistence of the mod-
ern/formal sector characterized by advanced technology, large establishment sizes, skilled
jobs, and high wages, and the traditional/informal sector with the contrasting features, is
persistent (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; OECD, 2009).1;2 The educational level of the pop-
ulation increased greatly, but the growth of the skill level, especially when measured by
the share of high-skill individuals, seems to be relatively modest, considering that enormous
gaps in cognitive skills with developed economies remain (Hanushek andWoessmann, 2008).3
Further, wage inequality between workers with basic skills (those taught in mandatory edu-
cation) and with advanced skills rose over time, while the inequality between workers with
and without basic skills fell greatly (Colclough, Kingdon, and Patrinos, 2010).4 This might
indicate that basic education has become less eﬀective in mitigating poverty but taking
further education, especially of good quality, is increasingly diﬃcult for the poor.
In order to understand these facts, this paper develops a dynamic dual-economy model
1To be exact, the modern-traditional classiﬁcation is mainly based on technologies, while the formal-
informal one is mainly based on oﬃcial registrations of businesses, so they are distinct. Firms with modern
technology may choose the informal sector due to heavy regulations or taxation (OECD, 2009).
2The traditional/informal sector can be divided into the urban informal sector, traditional agriculture,
and the household production sector (see footnote 6). Rapid urbanization lowered the share of agricul-
tural employment signiﬁcantly, but it did not raise the share of the modern/formal sector greatly in many
countries. According to OECD (2009), informal employment, deﬁned as the sum of urban informal-sector
employment and formal-sector one without social protection (such as social security beneﬁts) accounts for
the majority of non-agricultural employment in developing economies.
3According to Hanushek and Woessmann (2008), the share of students without basic literacy in cognitive
skills is more than 30% (as high as 82%) in most developing nations, while it is less than 10% (as low as 3%)
in developed nations. Further, the share of high-performing students in the skills is more than 10% (as high
as 22%) in most developed nations, while it is less than 1% (as low as 0.1%) in many developing nations.
Reviewing the literature, they conclude that there is compelling evidence that cognitive skills, rather than
mere school attainment, are strongly related to individual earnings and economic growth.
4Colclough, Kingdon, and Patrinos (2010) combine estimated returns to education in developing nations
from recent cross-section studies (32 studies for 35 countries) with those from earlier studies (more than 100
studies using data from the 1960s to early 1990s), and ﬁnd that, on average, the return to primary education
fell rapidly over time and became lower than returns to post-primary education, which, particularly the one to
tertiary education, fell very moderately. Since quality of education deteriorated over time in most developing
nations due to rising enrollment under harsh budget, quality-adjusted returns to advanced education seem
to have risen. They also review a limited number of country studies using time-series data after the 1980s,
which ﬁnd that the return to tertiary education rose greatly and the one to primary education fell.
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and examines how the long-run outcome of the economy depends on the initial distribution
of wealth and sectoral productivity. It is shown that, for fast transformation into a developed
economy, the initial distribution must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent and the
size of ”middle class” is enough. Both conditions seem to have held in the successful East
Asian economies largely because of successful land redistribution and eﬀective public school
system, where, as in the model economy undergoing such transformation, inequality between
workers with advanced education and others fell over time (Wood, 1994). In contrast, if the
former is satisﬁed but the latter is not, which would be the case for many developing nations
falling into ”middle income trap”, the fraction of workers with basic skills and the share of
the modern sector rise, but inequality between workers with advanced skills and with basic
skills worsens and the traditional sector remains for long periods, consistent with the above
facts.5 If the former condition does not hold, which would be true for poorest economies,
the dual structure and large inequality between workers without basic skills and others
(especially, those with advanced skills) last for very long periods.
The analysis is based on a deterministic, discrete-time, and small-open OLG model. The
economy is inhabited by a continuum of two-period-lived individuals who are homogeneous
in innate ability. In childhood, an individual receives a transfer from her parent and spends
it on assets and education. Basic education, which corresponds to acquiring essential skills
taught in mandatory education, is needed to become a middle-skill worker, and more-costly
advanced education is needed to become a high-skill worker. No credit market for the
educational investment exists, so she cannot invest more than the received transfer. Since
she can spend wealth on assets too, she invests in education only if it is ﬁnancially accessible
and proﬁtable. In adulthood, she obtains income from assets and work and spends it on
basic consumption, non-basic consumption, and a transfer to her single child.
The economy is composed of up to two sectors, the modern sector producing good M
and the traditional sector producing good T . The modern sector using advanced technology
employs high-skill and middle-skill workers, and the traditional sector employs low-skill
workers. Both goods can be used for basic consumption, while only good M can be used
for non-basic consumption. In other words, goods for basic needs, such as clothing, food,
and shelter, can be produced using either technology, while the advanced technology is
required to produce goods such as electric appliances and IT gadgets. It is assumed that
good M is tradable and good T is nontradable. The traditional sector produces goods for
basic needs using primitive technology, thus it corresponds to the urban informal sector,
5Although skill-biased technical change is a possible contributor to the increasing inequality in recent
years, particularly in middle-income economies, Colclough, Kingdon, and Patrinos (2010) ﬁnd that this
trend started well before IT technologies became economically important (see footnote 4).
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traditional agriculture, and the household production sector in real economy, all of which
supply goods mainly for domestic markets.6 By contrast, the modern sector corresponds
to modern manufacturing and commercial agriculture, which compete more directly with
foreign producers. If good T is relatively cheap, only the traditional sector supplies goods
for basic consumption, otherwise, the modern sector too or only the sector does.
Because the distribution of wealth in the initial period is unequal and the inequality is
transmitted intergenerationally through transfers, generally, individuals are heterogeneous
in accessibility to two types of education. Hence, those without enough wealth cannot take
basic or advanced education even if the return to the education net of its cost is positive.
Their descendants, however, may become accessible to it if enough wealth is accumulated.
(Opposite is true for descendants of relatively wealthy individuals.)
Main results, which are concerned with the situation where sectoral productivities are
not very low, are summarized as follows. First, the model has four types of steady states,
which are diﬀerent in proportions of the poor (those who cannot access advanced education)
and the very poor (those who cannot access basic education), wage inequality, the size of
the traditional sector, etc. The best steady state (in terms of aggregate output, aggregate
net income, and average utility) has features of a typical developed economy: no poverty
(universal access to advanced education), low wage inequality (wages net of education costs
are equal), high relative price of basic consumption, and no traditional sector (goods for ba-
sic consumption are totally supplied by the modern sector).7;8 Other three types of steady
states share the contrasting features, but diﬀer in characteristics of poverty and wage in-
equality: in one type, no extreme poverty (universal access to basic education) but prevalent
mild poverty, and high inequality between high-skill workers and others and low inequality
between middle-skill and low-skill workers, features of many middle-income economies; in
another type, no mild poverty (those who can access basic education can aﬀord advanced
education) but widespread extreme poverty, and high inequality between low-skill workers
and others and low inequality between high-skill and middle-skill workers; in yet another
type, as observed in poorest economies, pervasive extreme and mild poverty and typically
high inequalities among three types of workers.
Second, to which type of steady states the economy converges depends on the initial
6The urban informal sector supplies basic nontradable services, such as petty trading of commodities and
basic meals, and basic manufacturing goods mostly for domestic markets. Traditional agriculture is operated
on a small scale by family farms and produces agricultural products mainly for basic needs of domestic
consumers. And, the household sector produces basic goods and services mostly for self-consumption.
7Since net returns of two types of education are equal, some individuals just take basic education.
8Although wage inequality rose in most developed economies in recent decades, the level of the inequality
is still much lower than a typical developing economy. Further, the cost of higher education too rose greatly
in many of the economies, thus disparities in wages net of education costs enlarged more moderately.
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distribution of wealth. In particular, for the best steady state to be realized, the initial
distribution must be such that the very poor are not large in number and the non-poor
must be enough relative to the poor.9 If the initial size of the very poor is large, the dual
structure and large inequality between low-skill workers and others (especially, high-skill
workers) remain in the long run, i.e. the economy converges to either of the last two types
of steady states. If its size is not large but the non-poor are scarce relative to the poor,
the fraction of middle-skill workers and the share of the modern sector rise, and inequality
between middle-skill and low-skill workers shrinks over time. However, inequality between
high-skill and middle-skill workers worsens, and typically the traditional sector remains in
the long run, i.e. the economy converges to the second type.
These results are obtained from the model with time-invariant sectoral productivities.
When the productivity of the modern sector grows continuously over time, ultimately, the
economy converges to the best steady state from any initial condition, but the speed of
convergence depends critically on the initial condition and thus the qualitative results of
the constant productivity case remain to hold approximately. Hence, as stated earlier, the
model can explain the facts described at the beginning.10
The main implication is that, for fast modernization of an economy, the initial distribu-
tion of wealth must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent so that most people can
acquire basic skills and the size of ”middle class” is enough so that an adequate number of
workers possess advanced skills. Consistent with this and the above results, Hanushek and
Woessmann (2009), using data on international tests for 50 countries, ﬁnd that both the
share of students with basic skills and that of top performance have signiﬁcant eﬀects on eco-
nomic growth that are complementary each other. The model provides a sectoral-shift-based
explanation for their ﬁnding. The model’s implications are also consistent with ﬁndings by
Deininger and Olinto (2000) on relations among inequality, education, and growth, Easterly
(2001) on the importance of middle class in development, and La Porta and Shleifer (2008)
on the importance of educated managers in the expansion of the modern sector.11
9Note, however, that the economy can converge to the second and third types of steady states too,
depending on details of the initial distribution. The best steady state is more likely to be reached as the
size of the very poor is smaller and the proportion of the non-poor to the poor is higher.
10The paper also examines the situation where sectoral productivities are very low initially and grow
over time. When the modern sector’s productivity is very low, the best steady state does not exist and,
even with a good initial condition, the fraction of high-skill workers remains constant (that of middle-skill
workers rises) and inequality between high-skill and middle-skill workers (low-skill workers too after some
point) worsens over time. After the productivity reaches a certain level, however, the fraction rises, the
inequality falls, and the economy converges to the best steady state. The dynamics may resemble historical
experiences of many developed economies.
11Deininger and Olinto (2000) ﬁnd that growth is aﬀected negatively by initial land inequality (a proxy
for initial asset inequality) and positively by mean years of schooling, which in turn is negatively aﬀected
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This paper is related to the theoretical literature on dual economy models, such as Galor
and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1998), Lucas (2004), Wang and Xie (2004), Proto
(2007), Yuki (2007, 2008), and Vollrath (2009).12 Banerjee and Newman (1998) examine
implications of diﬀerences in technological and institutional conditions between rural tradi-
tional and urban modern sectors for development and urbanization. Lucas (2004) examines
rural-urban migration in a model where urban workers allocate time between human capital
accumulation and production. Wang and Xie (2004) explore factors aﬀecting the activa-
tion of a modern industry using a static two-sector model with non-homothetic preferences
and uncompensated spillovers in the IRS modern sector. Based on a three-sector (agrarian,
manufacturing, and informal) model, Proto (2007) analyzes how the initial number of un-
skilled landless workers, through its eﬀect on their bargaining power against landlords and
land rents, determines wealth and human capital accumulations and development. Vollrath
(2009) shows that the marginal product of labor in the modern sector can be higher than in
the traditional sector and such allocation is welfare-maximizing based on a model in which
individuals allocate time between market and non-market activities.
The more closely related are Galor and Zeira (1993) and Yuki (2007, 2008), which de-
velop dual economy models where, as in this paper, lumpy skill investment is constrained
by intergenerational transfers motivated by impure altruism and examine the relationship
between initial distribution and long-run outcome. Unlike the present paper, however, the
type of education (skill investment) is single, and either the traditional sector produces the
same good as the modern sector (Galor and Zeira) or only the sector can produce goods
for basic education (Yuki). Hence, their models cannot analyze how proportions of work-
ers with basic education and with advanced education, their wages, and wage inequality
between them change over time, thereby exploring what roles diﬀerent types of education
play in development. Further, they cannot capture the process where the production of
goods for basic consumption shifts from the traditional sector to the modern sector with
development, which is universally observed in real economy: in the models of Yuki (2007,
2008), the traditional sector remains even in the best steady state.
The paper is somewhat related to the empirical literature showing the existence of multi-
ple growth paths. van Paap, Franses, and Dijk (2005) and Owen, Videras, and Davis (2009)
by the initial inequality. Easterly (2001) ﬁnds that a greater size of middle class, measured as the share of
income held by second through fourth quintiles of the distribution, is associated with more education, higher
income, and higher growth. La Porta and Shleifer (2008) ﬁnd large diﬀerence between formal (modern) and
informal (traditional) ﬁrms in the human capital of their managers and indicates that this drives many other
diﬀerences, including the quality of inputs and access to ﬁnance.
12This paper is somewhat related to the theoretical literature on structural change, which is concerned
with the shift from agriculture to manufacturing and services in the process of development, such as Laitner
(2000), Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001), Hansen and Prescott (2002), and Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
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ﬁnd that countries can be clustered into multiple groups with distinct growth regimes. Alfo,
Trovato, and Waldman (2008) show that countries can be clustered into many groups with
diﬀerent levels of per capita GDP and with no sign of convergence across groups.
The paper is organized as follows. Since the model is a sequence of quasi-static economies
in which single generations make decisions, for ease of presentation, Section 2 presents and
analyzes the model without taking into account intergenerational linkages, then Section 3
considers the linkages. Section 4 analyzes the model and derives main results, and Section
5 concludes. Appendix B contains proofs of lemmas and propositions.
2 Model
Although the model is dynamic, it is a sequence of quasi-static economies in which single
generations make decisions. This section presents and analyzes the model without taking
into account intergenerational linkages, then the next section considers the linkages.13
2.1 Setup
Consider a deterministic, discrete-time, and small-open OLG economy. The economy is
inhabited by a continuum of two-period-lived individuals who are homogeneous in innate
ability. Each adult has a single child and thus the population is constant over time. The
adult population is normalized to be 1.
Lifetime of an individual: In childhood, individual i receives a transfer bi from her
parent and spends it on assets ai and education in order to maximize future income. Ba-
sic education (costs em), which corresponds to acquiring essential skills taught in primary
and lower secondary education, is needed to become a middle-skill worker, and advanced
education (costs eh>em) is needed to become a high-skill worker.
14 Thus, if she spends ej
(j=h;m) on education, ai=bi¡ej, and ai=bi if she does not take education. Since no credit
market exists for the educational investment, she cannot invest more than bi, i.e. ai¸0.
In adulthood, she obtains income from assets and work and spends it on basic con-
sumption ciB, non-basic consumption c
i
N , and a transfer to her single child (b
i)0. A unit of
non-basic consumption is a numeraire. Characteristics of the two types of consumption are
explained later. She maximizes the Cobb-Douglas utility subject to the budget constraint:
max U=(ciB)
°B(ciN)
°N [(bi)0]°b ; °i 2 (0; 1); °B+°N+°b=1; (1)
s:t: P ciB+c
i
N+(b
i)0=wi+(1+r)ai; (2)
where P is the relative price of basic consumption and wi is her gross wage. By solving the
maximization problem, the following consumption and transfer rules are obtained.
13All variables are presented without time subscripts in this section.
14The cost of advanced education includes the cost of acquiring basic skill.
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PciB=°B[w
i+(1+r)ai]; (3)
ciN=°N [w
i+(1+r)ai]; (4)
(bi)0=°b[wi+(1+r)ai]: (5)
Production: The small open economy (thus interest rate r is exogenous) is composed of
up to two sectors, the modern sector producing goodM and the traditional sector producing
good T . The modern sector, which utilizes advanced technology, employs high-skill and
middle-skill workers, and the traditional sector using primitive technology employs low-skill
workers for production. Production functions of the two sectors are:
YM=AM(Lh)
®(Lm)
1¡®; ®2(0; 1); (6)
YT =ATLl; (7)
where Lh, Lm, and Ll are numbers of high-skill, middle-skill, and low-skill workers respec-
tively, and Ai (i=M;T ) is the exogenous productivity of sector i.
15
Characteristics of goods and consumption: Both good M and good T can be used
for basic consumption, while only good M can be used for non-basic consumption. In other
words, goods for basic needs, such as clothing, food, and shelter, can be produced using
either technology, while goods such as electric appliances and IT gadgets can be produced
using the advanced technology only. Speciﬁcally, a unit of basic consumption can be fulﬁlled
by the consumption of either a unit of good T or µ units of goodM: The unit of measurement
of non-basic consumption is good M , so P · µ must hold.16
Assume that good M is tradable and good T is nontradable. The assumption would be
better understood by associating the two sectors with sectors in real economy. The tradi-
tional sector produces consumption goods for basic needs using primitive technology, thus it
corresponds to the urban informal sector, traditional agriculture, and the household sector.
The urban informal sector supplies basic nontradable services (such as retail of commodities
and meals) and basic manufacturing goods mostly for domestic markets, and accounts for
the majority of non-agricultural employment in many developing economies (OECD, 2009).
Traditional agriculture is operated by family farms and supplies products mainly for basic
needs of domestic consumers.17 And, the household sector produces basic goods and services
mostly for self-consumption, whose importance is signiﬁcant in developing countries. By con-
15Because free international capital mobility is assumed, the production function of the modern sector
may be considered as a reduced form of the function that includes physical capital K as an input:
YM=gAM (Lh)¯(Lm)°(K)1¡¯ ¡° ; ¯; ° 2(0; 1): (8)
When (6) is the reduced-form function, AM depends positively on gAM and negatively on r.
16Good M is used for education too: the education cost is that of purchasing a ﬁxed amount of the good.
17As in Yuki (2007), traditional agriculture may be introduced as a separate tradable sector operated by
low-skill farmers. The analysis would be much more complicated without aﬀecting most qualitative results.
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trast, the modern sector corresponds to modern manufacturing and commercial agriculture,
which compete more directly with foreign producers (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008).18
Determination of wages: Goods and labor markets are competitive, thus wages of
high-skill, middle-skill, and low-skill workers are given by:
wh=®AM
³
Lm
Lh
´1¡®
; (9)
wm=(1¡®)AM
³
Lh
Lm
´®
; (10)
wl=PAT : (11)
For later use, denote wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers net of costs of education
by fwj=wj¡(1+r)ej (j=h;m), which are:fwh=fwh³LhLm´´®AM³LmLh 1´¡®¡(1+r)eh; (12)fwm=fwm³LhLm´´(1¡®)AM³LhLm ®´¡(1+r)em: (13)
Determination of P: When the relative price of good T is low, only good T of the
traditional sector is used for basic consumption and thus its market-clearing condition is:
PATLl=°B[whLh+wmLm+wlLl+(1+r)
P
ia
i]; (14)
where the right-hand side is obtained by aggregating (3) over the adult population. Denote
aggregate intergenerational transfers by B. Then,
P
i a
i = B¡ (ehLh+emLm) holds. By
plugging this expression, wl=PAT , and Ll=1¡(Lh+Lm) into (14) and solving for P ,
P =
°B
1¡°B
[wh¡(1+r)eh]Lh+[wm¡(1+r)em]Lm+(1+r)B
AT [1¡(Lh+Lm)] ; (15)
which is expressed as an increasing function of Lh, Lm, and B by using (9) and (10):
P =P (Lh;Lm;B)´ °B
1¡°B
AM(Lh)
®(Lm)
1¡®+(1+r)[B¡ehLh¡emLm]
AT [1¡(Lh+Lm)] : (16)
P (Lh;Lm;B)·µ must hold for P =P (Lh;Lm;B) to be true.
When Lh; Lm; and B are large, the demand for good T is high and its supply is low
enough that P (Lh;Lm;B) > µ holds. Good M too is used for basic consumption and P =µ
holds. The amount of good M used for basic consumption, CBM , equals
CBM=°BfAM(Lh)®(Lm)1¡®+(1+r)[B¡ehLh¡emLm]g¡(1¡°B)µAT [1¡(Lh+Lm)]: (17)
From these results, the low-skill wage equals:
wl=wl(Lh;Lm;B)´
½
P (Lh;Lm;B)AT when P (Lh;Lm;B)·µ
µAT when P (Lh;Lm;B)¸µ : (18)
18In real economy, there exist skill-intensive modern sectors supplying nontradables. However, in develop-
ing countries, most of skill-intensive nontradables are public services, health services, and education, where
market forces have limited roles, while sectors such as ﬁnance and consulting services are limited in size.
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Figure 1: Shapes of critical loci determining educational choices and wages
2.2 Equilibrium educational choices and wages
Individuals are heterogenous in received transfer bi. Let Fh be the proportion of individuals
who can aﬀord eh to become a high-skill worker, and let Fm be the proportion of those who
cannot aﬀord eh but can aﬀord em to become a middle-skill worker (thus Fh + Fm · 1).
Since an individual can spend wealth on assets as well, she invests in education only if
it is ﬁnancially accessible and proﬁtable. An individual with bi ¸ eh spends eh only iffwh ¸maxffwm; wlg, and one with bi ¸ em spends em only if fwm ¸ wl. Thus, Lh · Fh and
Lh+Lm·Fh+Fm must hold, but Lh=Fh and Lm=Fm do not necessarily hold. This section
examines how Lh, Lm, and wages are determined depending on Fh, Fm, and B.
2.2.1 Critical equations determining educational choices and wages
As can be seen from the above discussion, magnitude relations of fwh to fwm and of fwm to wl
at Lh=Fh and Lm=Fm are critical in determining Lh and Lm. For example, if fwh ¸ fwm
and fwm ¸ wl at Lh = Fh and Lm = Fm, Lh = Fh and Lm = Fm hold in equilibrium, i.e. if
each level of education is proﬁtable when all individuals take highest aﬀordable education,
they do take it. Hence, combinations of Fh and Fm satisfying fwh( FhFm ) = fwm( FhFm ) and the
combinations satisfying fwm( FhFm ) = wl(Fh;Fm;B) are crucial.
Denote Fh
Fm
satisfying fwh( FhFm ) = fwm( FhFm ) by (FhFm)hm, and denote FhFm satisfying fwm( FhFm )=
µAT (wl when P =µ) by (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, which equals, from (13):
(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ=
h
µAT+(1+r)em
(1¡®)AM
i 1
®
: (19)
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Assumption 1 (Fh
Fm
)hm>(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ:
The assumption implies fwh = fwm > µAT at LhLm = (FhFm)hm; that is, the highest (lowest) net
middle-skill (high-skill) wage is strictly greater than the highest low-skill wage.
As for Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm ) =P (Fh;Fm;B)AT (wl when P < µ), Lemma A1 of
Appendix A examines its existence and properties. In particular, the lemma shows that it
can be expressed as Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh, where Á(¢) is a decreasing function.
From (18), Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh , fwm( FhFm ) = P (Fh;Fm;B)AT aﬀects educational choices
when P (Fh;Fm;B) · µ; and FhFm =(FhFm)ml;µ , fwm( FhFm ) = µAT aﬀects the choices when
P (Fh;Fm;B) ¸ µ. Hence, relative positions of P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ and these loci are impor-
tant, which is investigated in Lemma A2 of Appendix A.
Figure 1 illustrates shapes of the critical loci on the (Fm; Fh) plane. (F
y
h(B) is the intersec-
tion of Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh with
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, which decreases with B.) Since P (Fh;Fm;B)<
(>)µ below (above) P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ, Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh aﬀects educational choices below
P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ; and
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ aﬀects the choices above the locus.
2.2.2 Educational choices and wages
The next proposition presents educational choices and sectoral choices of individuals, based
on the lemmas. Henceforth, individuals with bi¸eh, those with bi2 [em; eh), and those with
bi<em are named the non-poor, the poor, and the very poor, respectively.
Proposition 1 (Educational choices and sectoral choices) Suppose Fh>0.
(i) If Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor are indiﬀerent between two education (fwh= fwm); the poor
strictly prefer basic education (fwm>wl), Lh= (FhFm)hm
1+(
Fh
Fm
)hm
(Fh+Fm)·Fh, Lm= 1
1+(
Fh
Fm
)hm
(Fh+
Fm)¸Fm, and Ll=1¡Fh¡Fm.
(ii) If Fh
Fm
<(Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor strictly prefer advanced education (fwh>fwm) and Lh=Fh.
(a) If Fh
Fm
2 ((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), the poor strictly prefer basic education (fwm >wl); Lm = Fm;
and Ll=1¡Fh¡Fm.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and Fh<F
y
h(B), if Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, the poor are indiﬀerent
between basic education and no education (fwm = wl); Lm = Á(Fh;B)Fh · Fm; and
Ll=1¡(1+Á(Fh;B))Fh; otherwise, same as (a).
2: Or else, fwm=wl; Lm=[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh·Fm; and Ll=1¡f1+[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1gFh.
Figure 2 illustrates how Lh and Lm are determined depending on Fh and Fm when
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT on the (Fm;Fh) plane.
19 As for Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh and
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, only
portions of the loci that are eﬀective (aﬀect the determination of Lh and Lm) are drawn.
19Loci are drawn for given B satisfying °B1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT . When B increases, Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh shifts to
the left and F yh(B) falls. When
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B¸µAT , P =µ always and the region Fh·F
y
h(B) disappears.
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Figure 2: Educational and sectoral choices when °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT (Proposition 1)
When Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor (those with b
i ¸ eh) are abundant relative to the
poor (those with bi2 [em; eh)) and thus net wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers are
equated. Hence, some of the non-poor do not take advanced education (when Fh
Fm
>(Fh
Fm
)hm),
while all the poor take basic education, i.e. Lh=
(
Fh
Fm
)hm
1+(
Fh
Fm
)hm
(Fh+Fm)<Fh and Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm.
By contrast, when Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm, the net high-skill wage is strictly higher than the net
middle-skill wage and thus all the non-poor take advanced education, i.e. Lh=Fh. As for
the poor, when Fh
Fm
2 ((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm) and thus the non-poor are not very scarce relative to
the poor, the net middle-skill wage is strictly higher than the low-skill wage and all of them
take basic education, i.e. Lm=Fm. When the scarcity is greater, i.e.
Fh
Fm
· (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ; choices
of the poor depend on Fh as well as
Fh
Fm
. For given Fh
Fm
, when Fh (thus Fm too) is small, i.e.
Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh, 1Á(Fh;B) <
Fh
Fm
(Á(Fh;B) is a decreasing function), the size of the modern
sector is small. Hence, the demand for good T , its relative price, and the low-skill wage are
low and thus Lm=Fm holds. In contrast, when Fh is not small, the low-skill wage equals
the net middle-skill wage and some of the poor do not take basic education.20
Proposition 2 shows how (net) wages depend on Fh, Fm, and B.
20Speciﬁcally, when the non-poor are not abundant (Fh < F
y
h(B)), P < µ and Lm = Á(Fh;B)Fh < Fm,
while when they are large in number (Fh¸F yh(B)), P =µ and Lm=[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh<Fm.
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Figure 3: Wages when °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT (Proposition 2)
Proposition 2 (Wages) Suppose Fh>0.
(i) If Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, fwh = fwm = fwm((FhFm)hm)(> wl), and wl = °B1¡°B gwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)B1¡(Fh+Fm)
when Fh+Fm<
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bh
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT i , wl=µAT otherwise.
(ii) If Fh
Fm
<(Fh
Fm
)hm,
(a) If Fh
Fm
2 ((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), fwh =fwh( FhFm ), fwm = fwm( FhFm ), and wl = P (Fh;Fm;B)AT when
P (Fh;Fm;B)· µ (possible when °B1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT ), wl = µAT otherwise, where fwh >fwm>wl.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and Fh<F
y
h(B), if Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwh=fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1) andfwm=wl=fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1) (<µAT <fwh); otherwise, same as (a) when P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ.
2: Or else, fwh=fwh((FhFm)ml;µ) and fwm=wl=µAT (<fwh).
Figure 3 illustrates magnitude relations of fwh, fwm, and wl and how the wages depend
on Fh, Fm, and B when
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT . In the ﬁgure, the locus P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ is
represented by a bold dashed line and P =µ on or above the line.
When Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor is abundant relative to the poor (those with b
i2 [em; eh))
and fwh=fwm=fwm((FhFm)hm) (the same level for any Fh and Fm in this region). Since both the
non-poor and the poor receive the same level of net wage, the demand for good T increases
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with Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm, not Fh and Fm separately, and thus wl increases with Fh+Fm, unless
Fh+Fm is high enough that P =µ and wl=µAT hold.
When Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm, the non-poor are scarce relative to the poor and thus fwh> fwm and
Lh=Fh. When the scarcity is not so great, i.e.
Fh
Fm
2 ((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), the net middle-skill
wage is not very low and fwm>wl and Lm=Fm hold. Hence, fwh decreases and fwm increases
with Fh
Fm
, while wl = P (Fh;Fm;B)AT increases with Fh, Fm; and B, unless they are high
enough that P = µ. When the scarcity is greater, i.e. Fh
Fm
· (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, the result depends
on Fh and
Fh
Fm
. For given Fh
Fm
, if Fh is small, i.e. Fm < Á(Fh;B)Fh, the result is same as
the previous case, whereas if Fh is higher, the demand for good T (and thus P ) is high
enough that fwm = wl holds. When Fh < F yh(B) and thus Lm = Á(Fh;B)Fh (see Figure 2),fwh =fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1) and fwm = wl = fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1), that is, fwh decreases and fwm = wl
increases with Fh and B, while when Fh¸F yh(B) and thus P = µ and Lm= [(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh,fwm=wl=µAT and fwh=fwh((FhFm)ml;µ), that is, the wages are constant.
To summarize magnitude relations of wages, when Fh
Fm
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm, fwh = fwm > wl; when
Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm and either
Fh
Fm
> (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ or Fm < Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwh > fwm > wl; and when FhFm ·
(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwh>fwm=wl.
A.2 of Appendix A examines how aggregate welfare, aggregate output, and sectoral com-
position depend on Fh, Fm; and B: To summarize the result, increased access to education
bringing higher net wages, i.e. Fh+Fm when fwh= fwm, Fh and Fm when fwh> fwm>wl, and
Fh when fwm=wl, raises welfare, output, and the modern sector’s shares in production and
basic consumption (when P = µ), and an increase in B raises welfare, output when P < µ,
and the sector’s share in basic consumption, but lowers its production share when P <µ.
3 Dynamics
As noted earlier, the model can be considered as a sequence of quasi-static economies con-
nected by intergenerational transfers. Based on results of the previous section, this section
takes into account the intergenerational linkages.
3.1 Dynamics of individual transfers
Remember that the individual transfer rule is given by (now with time subscripts):
bit+1=°b[w
i
t+(1+r)a
i
t]; (20)
where wit and a
i
t are the wage and the asset of individual i born in period t¡1 and spends
period t as an adult, and bit+1 is the transfer to her child (whose adulthood is in period t+1).
Since ait depends on b
i
t, the dynamic equation linking the received transfer b
i
t to the
transfer given to the next generation bit+1 can be derived from the above equation. For a
high-skill worker, by substituting ait=b
i
t¡eh into (20) and using fwht=wht¡(1+r)eh,
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bit+1=°bffwht+(1+r)bitg; (21)
where bit ¸ eh. °b(1+ r) < 1 is assumed so that the ﬁxed point for given fwht, b¤(fwht) ´
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwht, exists. For a middle-skill worker, a similar equation with the net wage gwmt and
bit¸em holds. Finally, for a low-skill worker, since ait=bit,
bit+1=°bfwlt+(1+r)bitg: (22)
The equations show that the dynamics of transfers within a lineage depend on the time
evolution of wages, which in turn are determined by the dynamics of Fht, Fmt, and Bt.
3.2 Aggregate dynamics
Given the initial distribution of transfers over the population, Fh0, Fm0, and B0 are deter-
mined directly, while levels of the aggregate variables in subsequent periods are determined
by the dynamics of the distribution of transfers. However, information on the distribu-
tional dynamics is not required to derive main implications of the model. What is needed
is information on directions of motion of the aggregate variables, which is examined in this
subsection. For exposition, the dynamics of Fht and Fmt and those of Bt are examined
separately ﬁxing the other variable(s) ﬁrst, then their interactions are taken into account.
3.2.1 Dynamics of Fht and Fmt
The dynamics of Fht and Fmt are determined by the dynamics of individual transfers. As for
the dynamics of Fht, if children of some middle-skill workers become accessible to advanced
education through wealth accumulation, Fht+1>Fht holds.
21 This takes places iﬀ there exist
lineages satisfying bit<eh and b
i
t+1¸eh. From (21) with fwht replaced by gwmt, the following
condition must hold for such lineages to exist:
b¤(gwmt) = °b
1¡°b(1+r)gwmt >eh: (23)
If the equation holds, Fht+1¸Fht, otherwise, Fht+1=Fht. (In the former case, Fht+1=Fht is
possible depending on the distribution of transfers, but, if the equation continues to hold,
Fht does increase at some point.)
Regarding levels of b¤(fwht) and b¤(gwmt), the following is assumed.
Assumption 2 b¤(fwh((FhFm)hm)) = b¤(fwm((FhFm)hm)) = °b1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm)>eh:
The assumption implies that oﬀspring of high-skill (middle-skill) workers can aﬀord advanced
education when their wage is lowest (highest) and thus Fht never decreases. Assume that
the initial distribution of transfers is such that Fh0>0. Then, Fht>0 for any t>0.
21From Assumption 3 below, children of low-skill workers never become accessible to advanced education.
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Figure 4: Dynamics of Fht and Fmt for given B
As for the dynamics of Fmt, since Fht+1 ¸ Fht is true, if b¤(wlt) = °b1¡°b(1+r)wlt > em,
Fht+1+Fmt+1 ¸ Fht+Fmt; if b¤(gwmt) = °b1¡°b(1+r)gwmt < em; Fht+1 = Fht and Fmt+1 · Fmt;
otherwise, Fht+1+Fmt+1=Fht+Fmt.
Hence, directions of motion of Fht and Fmt can be known from magnitude relations of
b¤(gwmt) to eh and em and of b¤(wlt) to em, except when b¤(gwmt)>eh and b¤(wlt)>em, in which
the direction of motion of Fmt is ambiguous (Fht+1¸Fht and Fht+1+Fmt+1¸Fht+Fmt).
Regarding the value of b¤(wlt), the following is assumed.
Assumption 3 °b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT 2(em; eh):
The assumption states that children of some low-skill workers can aﬀord basic education but
not advanced education when their wage is highest. The two assumptions are maintained
until Section 4.3 where eﬀects of productivity growth are examined.
From these assumptions and Proposition 2, there exist combinations of Fh and Fm satis-
fying b¤(fwm)=eh, those satisfying b¤(fwm)=em, and those satisfying b¤(wl)=em (see Figure
4). b¤(fwm) = eh equals a FhFm 2 ((FhFm)ml;µ; (FhFm)hm) such that °b1¡°b(1+r) fwm( FhFm ) = eh. If F [h(B)
(a decreasing function) is deﬁned as Fh satisfying
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm( 1Á(Fh;B)) = em; b¤(fwm) = em
equals a Fh
Fm
<(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ such that
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm( FhFm )=em for Fm<Á(F [h(B);B)F [h(B) and equals
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Fh=F
[
h(B) for Fm¸Á(F [h(B);B)F [h(B). Finally, b¤(wl)=em equals:
for Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm;
°b
1¡°b(1+r)
°B
1¡°B
fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)B
1¡(Fh+Fm) =em (24)
, Fh+Fm=
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em¡ °B1¡°B (1+r)B
°B
1¡°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em ; (25)
for Fh
Fm
2
³fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi; (FhFm)hm´ ; °b1¡°b(1+r)P (Fh;Fm;B)AT =em; (26)
and for Fh
Fm
·fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi, Fh=F [h(B): (27)
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of Fht and Fmt for given B by placing the three critical
loci on the (Fm; Fh) plane. In the ﬁgure, b
¤(fwm)>(<)eh at the left (right) side of b¤(fwm)=eh
(the bold solid line), b¤(fwm)>(<)em above (below) b¤(fwm)=em (the bold dashed line), and
b¤(wl)> (<)em above (below) b¤(wl) = em (the bold dotted line). Positions of Fht and Fmt
relative to the three loci determine directions of motion of the two variables. In regions with
horizontal arrows only, only Fmt changes: for example, in the region below b
¤(fwm) = em,
b¤(fwm)<em holds and thus Fmt decreases. Arrows with slope ¡1 are present in the region
above b¤(fwm) = eh and on or below b¤(wl) = em, because b¤(fwm)> eh and b¤(wl)· em and
thus Fht increases with Fht+Fmt constant. By contrast, in the region above b
¤(wl)=em and
b¤(fwm)=eh (thus b¤(wl)>em and b¤(fwm)>eh) and below Fh+Fm=1, arrows with slope ¡1
and horizontal arrows are drawn, since Fht and Fht+Fmt increase but the direction of Fmt
is ambiguous (the direction of motion of Fht and Fmt is between the two arrows). Finally,
both Fht and Fmt are constant and thus no arrows are present in the region on or below
b¤(fwm)=eh and b¤(wl)=em and on or above b¤(fwm)=em.
Note that positions of b¤(fwm)= em and b¤(wl)= em as well as those of P (Fh;Fm;B)= µ
and Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh change with B. Thus, the dynamics of Fht and Fmt must be examined
together with those of Bt. Before examining the joint dynamics, the dynamic equation of
Bt is derived and the direction of motion of Bt for given Fht and Fmt is examined next.
3.2.2 Dynamics of aggregate transfers
The dynamic equation of aggregate transfers is obtained by aggregating the dynamic equa-
tions for individual transfers over the population:
Bt+1=°b ffwhtLht+gwmtLmt+wlt(1¡Lht¡Lmt)+(1+r)Btg ; (28)
where the expression inside the curly bracket of the RHS is aggregate income net of education
costs, which can be expressed as a function of Fht, Fmt, and Bt.
A.3 of Appendix A analyzes the equation and its ﬁxed point in detail. It is shown that
the equation diﬀers depending on Fht and Fmt, and for given Fht and Fmt, the direction of
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motion of Bt is determined by the magnitude relation of Bt to the ﬁxed point: Bt increases
(decreases) when it is smaller (greater) than the value at the ﬁxed point. For later use,
notations of the ﬁxed points are: bB¤(Fht+Fmt) when FhtFmt ¸ (FhFm)hm; B¤(Fht;Fmt) when FhtFmt 2
((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), and B
¤
(Fht) when
Fht
Fmt
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, all of which are increasing functions.
3.3 Joint dynamics of the aggregate variables
As mentioned earlier, as Bt changes over time, positions of P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ, Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh,
b¤(fwm) = em, and b¤(wl) = em in Figure 4 change and thus directions of motion of Fht and
Fmt could be aﬀected. Hence, in general, it is diﬃcult to analyze the joint dynamics using
a diagram like Figure 4.
However, it turns out that under the following weak assumption on B0, characteristics
of the dynamics are mostly determined by relative positions of Fht and Fmt to these loci
when aggregate transfers are at ﬁxed point levels (and relative positions to b¤(fwm) = eh,
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm, and
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ).
Assumption 4 The initial level of aggregate transfers is such that B0·B¤(Fh0) when Fh0Fm0 ·
minf[Á(Fh0;B0)]¡1;(FhFm)ml;µg; B0·B¤(Fh0;Fm0) when Fh0Fm0 2
³
minf[Á(Fh0;B0)]¡1;(FhFm)ml;µg; (FhFm)hm´ ,
and B0· bB¤(Fh0+Fm0) when Fh0Fm0 ¸(FhFm)hm.
The assumption states that the initial level of aggregate transfers is less than the ﬁxed point
level at (Fh;Fm)=(Fh0;Fm0), that is, initial wealth accumulation is not very large.
From (16) and (38), P (Fh;Fm;B
¤(Fh;Fm))=µ equals:
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFh+emFm)
AT [1¡(Fh+Fm)] =µ: (29)
As for Fm=Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))Fh, Lemma A3 of Appendix A shows that Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)) is decreasing
in Fh. If F
[
h is deﬁned as Fh satisfying
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm( 1Á(Fh;B¤(Fh))) = em, b¤(fwm) = em equals a
Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ such that
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm( FhFm ) = em for Fm < Á(F [h;B¤(F [h))F [h and Fh = F [h for
Fm¸Á(F [h;B
¤
(F [h))F
[
h. Finally, from (25) and (34), b
¤(wl)=em equals:
for Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm; Fh+Fm=
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em ; (30)
for Fh
Fm
2
³fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi; (FhFm)hm´ ; °b1¡°b(1+r)P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm))AT =em; (31)
and for Fh
Fm
·fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi, Fh=F [h: (32)
Hence, shapes of these loci are similar to the case of constant B and their positions on
the (Fh;Fm) plane can be illustrated by a ﬁgure similar to Figure 4.
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4 Main Results
4.1 Characteristics of steady states
Before the dynamics are examined, characteristics of steady states are investigated. The
next proposition shows that there exist four types of steady states. (F yh is deﬁned as Fh
satisfying [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1 = (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ).
Proposition 3 (Steady states) There exist the following four types of steady states.22
1: (Fh;Fm;B) = (1;0; bB¤(1)): Lh and Lm satisfy LhLm =(FhFm)hm and Lh+Lm=1 (thus Ll=0 and
YT =0), P =µ; and fwh=fwm=fwm((FhFm)hm).
2: Fh = Lh satisﬁes Fh>F
[
h and b
¤(fwm)·eh, Fh1¡Fh ·fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi, and Fm = 1¡Fh.
a:When Fh
1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ; B = B
¤
(Fh); Lm=maxfÁ(Fh; B¤(Fh));[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1gFh (thus Ll=
1¡Fh¡Lm and YT > 0), P =P (Fh;Lm;B¤(Fh))<µ if Fh<F yh and P = µ otherwise, andfwh=fwh(minf[Á(Fh; B¤(Fh))]¡1;(FhFm)ml;µg)>fwm=wl=PAT .
b:When Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ; B =B
¤(Fh;Fm), Lm = Fm = 1¡Fh (thus Ll = 0 and YT = 0),
P =µ, and fwh=fwh(FhFm)>fwm=fwm(FhFm).
3: Fh satisﬁes b
¤(wl)· em,Fh·
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em and (Fm;B) = (0;
bB¤(Fh)).
Lh and Lm satisfy
Lh
Lm
= (Fh
Fm
)hm and Lh+Lm = Fh (thus Ll = 1¡Fh and YT > 0);
P = °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)Fh
AT (1¡Fh) <µ, and fwh=fwm=fwm((FhFm)hm)>wl=PAT .
4: Fh and Fm satisfy
Fh
Fm
2
hfwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi;fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehii and P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm))AT ·
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em, and B=B
¤(Fh;Fm): Lh=Fh, Lm=Fm; and Ll=1¡Fh¡Fm (thus YT > 0),
P =P (Fh;Fm;B
¤(Fh;Fm))<µ; and fwh=fwh(FhFm)>fwm=fwm(FhFm)>wl=PAT .
Figure 5 illustrates four types of steady states, which diﬀer in proportions of the poor
and the very poor, wage inequality, the size of the traditional sector, etc. In Steady state
1, all individuals are non-poor, i.e. they have enough wealth to take advanced education
(Fh = 1), net wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers are equal (fwh = fwm), and the
traditional sector does not exist (thus P = µ and Ll=0). In Steady state 2, the very poor
do not exist, i.e. everyone can access at least basic education (Fh+Fm=1), but inequality
between high-skill workers and others exists (fwh> fwm). When Fh1¡Fh · (FhFm)ml;µ, net wages of
middle-skill and low-skill workers are equal (fwm=wl), thus some do not take basic education
(Ll>0) and the traditional sector exists, where P <µ if Fh<F
y
h and P =µ otherwise. When
Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ; by contrast, everyone takes at least basic education (Ll=0), thus only the
modern sector exists and P = µ. In Steady state 3, there are no poor people (Fm = 0)
22Actually, there exists another type of steady states satisfying Fh=F [h, Fm>Á(Fh; B
¤
(Fh))Fh; and B =
B
¤
(Fh), but this cannot be reached out of the steady states and thus is not considered.
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Figure 5: Steady states (Proposition 3)
and fwh = fwm holds as in Steady state 1, but the very poor do exist (Fh < 1) and become
low-skill workers (Ll>0), inequality between low-skill workers and others is high, and only
the traditional sector supplies goods for basic consumption (thus P <µ). In Steady state 4,
both the poor and the very poor exist, there are inequalities among three types of workers
(fwh>fwm>wl), and the traditional sector is the sole supplier of goods for basic consumption.
Steady state 1 has features of a typical developed economy: no poverty, low wage in-
equality (wages net of education costs are equal), high relative price of basic consumption,
and no traditional sector (goods for basic consumption are totally supplied by the modern
sector). Other types of steady states share the contrasting features (except no traditional
sector when Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ of Steady state 2), but diﬀer in characteristics of poverty and
wage inequality. In Steady state 2, extreme poverty does not exist but many cannot access
advanced education, thus wage inequality between high-skill and other workers is high, while
inequality between middle-skill and low-skill workers is low, features of many middle-income
economies. In Steady state 3, those who can aﬀord basic education can access advanced edu-
cation as well, but many cannot aﬀord even basic education, hence wage inequality between
low-skill workers and others is high, while net wages of high-skill and middle-skill workers
are equal. In Steady state 4, as observed in poorest economies, many cannot aﬀord basic or
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advanced education, and typically inequality between middle-skill and low-skill workers as
well as the one between high-skill and middle-skill workers are high.
Proposition A3 of Appendix A examines welfare, output, and sectoral composition of the
steady states. It conﬁrms that Steady state 1 is the best in terms of aggregate net income,
average utility, and aggregate output. Other steady states cannot be ranked deﬁnitely, but
if they are to be ranked, Steady state 2 is the second best, Steady state 3 follows, and
Steady state 4 is the worst. In each type of steady states, these variables increase with
the proportion(s) of those accessible to education for jobs with higher net wages, i.e. Fh in
Steady states 2 and 3, and Fh and Fm in Steady state 4 (see Figure 5). Somewhat consistent
with a ﬁnding by La Porta and Shleifer (2008), in Steady states 2 and 4, the production
share of the modern sector decreases with Fh
Fm
when Fh
Fm
is relatively low.23
4.2 Relationship between initial conditions and steady states
From a given initial distribution of wealth, to which type of steady states does the economy
converge in the long run? Proposition A4 of Appendix A analyzes the issue in detail.
Figure 6 presents illustrative trajectories of the dynamics based on the proposition. The
position of (Fh;Fm) = (Fh0;Fm0) relative to b
¤(fwm)= eh essentially determines whether the
economy can converge to Steady state 1 or not. When Fh0
Fm0
·fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi (the region on
or below b¤(fwm)= eh), Steady state 1 cannot be reached except rare possibilities described
in the proposition. Because high-skill workers are scarce relative to middle-skill workers, the
middle-skill wage is not high enough for children of middle-skill workers to access advanced
education, i.e. Fht is constant. If Fh0 and Fm0 are relatively high, the low-skill wage is high
enough that b¤(wl)>em holds initially, descendants of low-skill workers become accessible
to basic education over time, i.e. Fmt increases, and the economy converges to Steady state
2. By contrast, if b¤(wl)· em holds initially, Fmt non-increases (Fmt decreases while FhtFmt is
low enough that b¤(fwm)<em is satisﬁed), and the economy converges to Steady state 4.
When Fh0
Fm0
> fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi, the middle-skill wage is high enough that descendants of
middle-skill workers become accessible to advanced education over time, i.e. Fht increases.
Unless Fh0
Fm0
¸ (Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl)·em, in which case Fht+Fmt is constant and the ﬁnal state
is Steady state 3, the economy could converge to Steady state 1 through rises in Fht
Fmt
and
Fht (thus inequality between high-skill workers and others falls), although it could converge
to Steady states 2 and 3 too depending on details of the initial distribution. Steady state 1
23La Porta and Shleifer (2008) ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in the average share of the informal sector in GDP
between countries in the bottom quartile of the income distribution and those in the second quartile are
very small, and in one measure, the share of the latter group is slightly higher, although the employment
share is much lower.
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Figure 6: Initial conditions and steady states (Proposition A4)
is more likely to be reached when wages of low-skill and middle-skill wages are high relative
to the high-skill wage, i.e. when Fh0, Fm0, and
Fh0
Fm0
are relatively high.
The result suggests that, for the best long-run outcome to be realized, the initial distri-
bution of wealth must be such that the very poor (those without enough wealth to acquire
basic skills) are not large in number and the non-poor (those with enough wealth to acquire
advanced skills) must be suﬃcient relative to the poor. Both conditions seem to have held
in a small number of East Asian economies evolving into developed economies, largely be-
cause of successful land redistribution and eﬀective public school system. As in the model
economy converging to Steady state 1, inequality between workers with advanced education
and others fell over time in the course of development in these economies (Wood, 1994).
If the initial size of the very poor is large, i.e. Fh0 + Fm0 is low, which would be true
for poorest economies, the dual structure and large inequality between low-skill workers and
others (particularly, high-skill workers) persist, because good T is cheap and thus low-skill
workers with meager wage cannot escape from misery. If the size of the very poor is not
large but the non-poor are scarce relative to the poor, i.e. Fh0 + Fm0 is not low but
Fh0
Fm0
is
low, which would be the case for typical developing nations with modest growth, low-skill
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workers are better-paid, thus the proportion of middle-skill workers and the share of the
modern sector rise and inequality between middle-skill and low-skill workers shrinks over
time.24 However, since children of middle-skill workers have diﬃculty in ”moving up” due
to low middle-skill wage, inequality between high-skill and middle-skill workers worsens over
time. And, the lack of adequate number of high-skill workers typically restrains the growth
of the modern sector and thus the traditional sector continues to supply goods for basic
consumption. These are what an average developing economy has experienced, as described
at the beginning of the introduction.
The main implication is that, for the full modernization of an economy, the initial dis-
tribution of wealth must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent so that most people
can acquire basic skills and the size of ”middle class” is enough so that an adequate number
of workers possess advanced skills. Consistent with this and the above results, Hanushek
and Woessmann (2009), using data on international student achievement tests for 50 coun-
tries, ﬁnd that both the share of students with basic skills and that of top performance
have signiﬁcant eﬀects on economic growth that are complementary each other. The model
provides a sectoral-shift-based explanation for their ﬁnding. The model’s implications are
also consistent with ﬁndings by Deininger and Olinto (2000) on relations among inequality,
education, and growth, Easterly (2001) on the importance of middle class in development,
and La Porta and Shleifer (2008) on the importance of educated managers in the expansion
of the modern sector (see footnote 11 in the introduction for details).
4.3 Productivity Growth
So far, productivity levels of the two sectors, AM and AT , are assumed to be time-invariant.
In real economy, they change over time, in particular, AM usually grows persistently due to
technological growth. What happens to the dynamics and steady states when AM increases
over time? From the equations for the critical loci in the previous section, an increase in
AM shifts
Fh
Fm
= (Fh
Fm
)hm upward and shifts the remaining loci except Fm = Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))Fh
(the eﬀect is ambiguous) downward on the (Fm;Fh) plane with relative positions of the loci
unchanged (see Figure 6). Hence, over time, the economy becomes more likely to converge
to Steady state 1 and, as observed in developed nations, the relative number of high-skill
workers to middle-skill workers in the best steady state rises. With the continuous produc-
tivity growth, the economy converges to the best steady state from any initial condition
ultimately, but the speed of convergence depends critically on the initial condition. Hence,
qualitative results of the constant AM case remain to hold approximately.
24To be precise, if the size of the non-poor is very small, i.e. Fh0<F [h, this description does not apply. As
is clear from Figure 6, Fmt falls over time and the long-run state becomes same as the case of low Fh0+Fm0.
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Figure 7: Case of low AM , i.e.
°b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm)·eh
Another assumption maintained until now is Assumption 2, °b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm) > eh,
which states that oﬀspring of high-skill (middle-skill) workers can aﬀord advanced education
at fwh = fwm; that is, when their wage is lowest (highest). The assumption would apply to
most economies in the present world except those with very bad institutions, but it may
not in the past. If °b
1¡°b(1+r) fwm((FhFm)hm)· eh holds but AM is not extremely low, the phase
diagram looks like Figure 7.25 Unlike Figure 6, b¤(fwh) = eh, not b¤(fwm) = eh; exists below
Fh
Fm
= (Fh
Fm
)hm and above b
¤(fwm) = em. Since Fht decreases over time above b¤(fwh) = eh;
Fh=Fm=1 is not a steady state. There exist two types of steady states similar to Steady
states 2 and 4 of the original economy, where the convergence to the former type of steady
state is more likely as Fh0 and Fm0 are higher.
The related assumption on AT is Assumption 3,
°b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT 2(em; eh). The productivity
of the traditional sector is less aﬀected by the advancement of science and technology, but
it also would grow slowly over time in real economy, thus the assumption may not hold far
in the past or in the future. (It may not hold for an economy with very bad land quality
or climate too.) When °b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT · em, children of low-skill workers cannot access basic
education even at P = µ and Fmt non-increases over time. Figure 8 illustrates this case.
Unlike the original economy, b¤(wl) = em does not exist, FhFm = (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ is located below
25When AM is extremely low, b¤(fwh)= eh is located below b¤(gwm)= em, and the economy converges to
Fh=Fm = 0 from any initial distribution, which is clearly not realistic in modern times.
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Figure 8: Case of low AT, i.e.
°b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT ·em
b¤(fwm) = em, and the dividing locus between P < µ and P = µ (the locus with the broken
line) is located at the lower position on the (Fm;Fh) plane. With constant AT ; there exist
two kinds of steady states, one ”combining” Steady states 1 and 3 of the original economy
and the other ”combining” Steady states 2 and 4, and if b¤(fwm)>eh at (Fh;Fm)=(Fh0;Fm0);
the economy converges to the ﬁrst type of steady state, otherwise, it converges to the other
one. By contrast, when °b
1¡°b(1+r)µAT > eh; that is, even children of low-skill workers can
access advanced education at P =µ, the result is somewhat similar to the original case, but
the economy is more (less) likely to converge to Steady state 1 (Steady state 2).26
These results can be used to examine the dynamics from far in the past when the pro-
ductivities of both sectors grow over time. For example, as for an economy whose initial
AM does not satisfy Assumption 2 but initial AT satisﬁes Assumption 3, the dynamics are
illustrated by Figure 7 at ﬁrst and by Figure 6 after some point.27 Hence, if Fh0 and Fm0
are relatively high, at ﬁrst, Fmt; but not Fht, rises and the inequality between high-skill
26In this case, FhFm = (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ is located above b¤(gwm) = eh; b¤(wl) = eh exists and is located between
b¤(wl)= em and the dividing locus between P <µ and P = µ; and b¤(wl)= eh and b¤(gwm)= eh intersect on
Fm = Á(Fh; B
¤
(Fh))Fh (see Figure 6). If the initial economy is located above b¤(wl) = eh; it converges to
Steady state 1 for certain, otherwise, the dynamics are qualitatively same as the original economy.
27As mentioned before, the growth of AM shifts FhFm =(
Fh
Fm
)hm and b¤(fwh)=eh upward and the remaining
loci except Fm=Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))Fh (the eﬀect is ambiguous) downward. The growth of AT ; by contrast, shifts
Fh
Fm
= (FhFm)ml;µ and the dividing locus between P < µ and P = µ upward. If AM grows faster than AT ; a
realistic assumption, the two loci shift downward, so the transition from Figure 7 to Figure 6 takes place.
24
and middle-skill workers (low-skill workers too when P = µ) enlarges over time, but after
AM becomes high enough for the assumption to hold, Fht rises, the inequality shrinks, and
the economy converges to the best steady state. The dynamics may resemble historical
experiences of many developed economies.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a dynamic dual-economy model and examined how the long-run
outcome of the economy depends on the initial distribution of wealth and sectoral pro-
ductivity. It is shown that, for fast transformation into a developed economy, the initial
distribution must be such that extreme poverty is not prevalent so that most people can
acquire basic skills and the size of ”middle class” is enough so that an adequate number
of workers possess advanced skills. Both conditions seem to have held in successful East
Asian economies largely because of eﬀective land redistribution and eﬃcient public school
system, where, as in the model economy undergoing such transformation, inequalities be-
tween workers with advanced education and others fell over time (Wood, 1994). In contrast,
if the former condition is satisﬁed but the latter is not, which would be the case for many
developing nations falling into ”middle income trap”, consistent with facts, the fraction of
workers with basic skills and the share of the modern sector rise, but inequality between
workers with advanced skills and with basic skills worsens and the traditional sector remains
for long periods. If the former condition does not hold, which would be true for poorest
economies, the dual structure and large inequality between workers without basic skills and
others (especially, those with advanced skills) last for very long periods. Consistent with
these results, Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) ﬁnd that both the share of students with
basic skills and that of top performance have signiﬁcant eﬀects on economic growth that are
complementary each other.
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Appendix A: Supplementary analysis
A.1 Critical equations determining educational choices and wages
This section examines in detail critical equations determining educational choices and wages,
in particular, Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm ) = P (Fh;Fm;B)AT , Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh and
P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ. Remember that (
Fh
Fm
)hm is
Fh
Fm
satisfying fwh( FhFm ) = fwm( FhFm ), which exists
and is unique since fwh (fwm) decreases (increases) with FhFm and fwh>(<)fwm at FhFm =0(=+1)
from (12) and (13), and (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ is
Fh
Fm
satisfying fwm( FhFm )=µAT (wl when P =µ).
Lemma A1 shows the existence of Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT when
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and describes its shape and its relation with (
Fh
Fm
)hm and (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ. (When
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B¸µAT ; P (Fh;Fm;B)>µ from (16) and thus P =µ:)
Lemma A1 Suppose °B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT . Then, positive Fh and Fm satisfying fwm( FhFm ) =
P (Fh;Fm;B)AT exists and is expressed as Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh, where Á(¢) is a function sat-
isfying limFh!0 Á(Fh;B) = Á(B) ´
·
(1¡®)AM
(1+r)(
°B
1¡°B B+em)¸
1
®
. When Fh
Fm
· (Fh
Fm
)hm, Á(Fh;B) is a
decreasing function of its arguments, and, for given B, there exists a unique Fh > 0 satis-
fying [Á(Fh;B)]
¡1 = (Fh
Fm
)hm, denoted F
z
h(B), and the one satisfying [Á(Fh;B)]
¡1 = (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
denoted F yh(B), where F
z
h(B) and F
y
h(B) are decreasing functions and F
z
h(B)>F
y
h(B).
Based on the lemma, Figure 9 illustrates Fm= Á(Fh;B)Fh (fwm( FhFm ) =P (Fh;Fm;B)AT ),
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm, and
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ on the (Fm; Fh) plane. F
z
h(B) and F
y
h(B) are unique intersec-
tions of Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh with
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, respectively. As Fh ! 0; Fm
satisfying Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh approaches 0 (since limFh!0 Á(Fh;B)=Á(B) < 1). FhFm = 1Á(Fh;B)
increases with Fh, thus Fm increases with Fh on the curve for low
1
Á(Fh;B)
, but the relation-
ship turns negative for high 1
Á(Fh;B)
. As B increases, Á(Fh;B) decreases and thus the curve
shifts leftward and F zh(B) and F
y
h(B) decrease.
Lemma A2 describes the shape of P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ and its relation with Fm=Á(Fh;B)Fh.
Lemma A2 Suppose °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT . When
Fh
Fm
2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)hm] ([Á(0)]
¡1 is the small-
est Fh
Fm
satisfying Fm=Á(Fh;0)Fh), P (Fh;Fm;B) is an increasing function of its arguments.
Given B, for any Fh
Fm
2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)hm], Fh and Fm satisfying P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ exist and are
unique, and for Fh
Fm
>(<)(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, Fm<(>)Á(Fh;B)Fh when P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ.
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Figure 9: Lemma A1
A.2 Eﬀects of Fh, Fm; and B on welfare, output, and sectoral
composition
This section examines eﬀects of Fh, Fm; and B on aggregate income net of education costs
(NI ´ fwhLh+ fwmLm+wl(1¡Lh¡Lm)+(1+ r)B), average utility, aggregate output (Y =
YM+PYT ), the share of the modern sector in production (
YM
Y
), and the sector’s share in
basic consumption when P =µ (CBM
PCB
).
Proposition A1 (Net aggregate income and average utility) Suppose Fh>0.
(i) If Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm, NI and average utility increase with Fh+Fm and B.
(ii) If Fh
Fm
<(Fh
Fm
)hm,
(a) If Fh
Fm
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), they increase with Fh; Fm; and B.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT and Fh<F
y
h(B), if Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, they increase with Fh
and B; otherwise, same as (a).
2: Or else, they increase with Fh and B.
Both net aggregate income and average utility increase with B and the proportion(s) of
individuals accessible to education for jobs with higher net wages, i.e. Fh+Fm when fwh=fwm,
Fh and Fm when fwh> fwm>wl, and Fh when fwm=wl. As for NI and average utility when
P =µ, this is because the negative eﬀect through fwh or fwm (except when fwh=fwm>wl=µAT
or fwh> fwm=wl= µAT ) is dominated by positive eﬀects through other wages (except whenfwh= fwm>wl = µAT ), proportions of workers with higher net wages, and B. When P < µ,
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increases in these variables raise P and thus have a negative eﬀect on average utility, but
the positive eﬀect through net aggregate income dominates.
Proposition A2 (Aggregate output and sectoral composition) Suppose Fh>0.
(i) If Fh
Fm
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm, when Fh+Fm<
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bh
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT i , Y increases with Fh+Fm and B;
and YM
Y
increases with Fh+Fm
B
; otherwise, they increase with Fh+Fm; and
CBM
PCB
increases
with Fh+Fm and B.
(ii) If Fh
Fm
<(Fh
Fm
)hm,
(a) If Fh
Fm
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), when P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ (possible only when °B1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT ),
Y increases with Fh; Fm; and B; and
YM
Y
increases with Fh and Fm and decreases with
B; otherwise, they increase with Fh and Fm; and
CBM
PCB
increases with Fh; Fm; and B.
(b) If Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
1:When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT and Fh <F
y
h(B), if Fm ¸ Á(Fh;B)Fh, Y increases with Fh
and B; and YM
Y
decreases with B (depends on Fh too); otherwise, same as (a) when
P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ.
2: Or else, Y and YM
Y
increase with Fh; and
CBM
PCB
increases with Fh and B.
When P < µ, aggregate output increases with B and the proportion(s) of individuals
accessible to education for jobs with higher net wages, as NI and average utility do. In the
case of Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh, this is because the increased proportion(s) raises Lh and Lm and
shifts production to the more productive modern sector (an increase in YM is greater than
a decrease in YT ), plus they and B increase NI, thereby raising the demand for good T and
thus P .28 The modern sector’s share in production increases with the proportion(s) (except
the case Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh of (b) 1, where the eﬀect is ambiguous) but decreases with B.
When P =µ, by contrast, P does not depend on NI and thus Y and YM
Y
are independent
of B (and increase with the proportion(s)). The modern sector too produces goods for basic
consumption, i.e. CBM > 0, in this case. The proportion of basic consumption supplied by
the sector increases with B as well as the proportion(s), because CBM
PCB
= PCB¡PYT
PCB
=1¡ µYT
°BNI
and thus it increases with NI and decreases with YT =AT (1¡Lh¡Lm).
A.3 The dynamic equation of Bt and its ﬁxed point
This section examines the dynamic equation of Bt; (28), of Section 3.2 and its ﬁxed point.
When Fht
Fmt
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm, if Fht+Fmt<
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bt
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT and thus Pt<µ, the equation is:
Bt+1=
°b
1¡°B ffwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt)+(1+r)Btg: (33)
28In the case Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh of (b) 1, the eﬀect of Fh on YM is ambiguous and that of B is negative, but
their eﬀects on PYT are positive and dominate.
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°b
1¡°B (1+r)<1 is assumed so that the ﬁxed point for given Fht+Fmt exists, which equals:bB¤(Fht+Fmt)= °b
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt): (34)
Clearly, when Bt<(>) bB¤(Fht+Fmt), Bt+1>(<)Bt. If Fht+Fmt¸ (1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bt
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT and
thus Pt=µ, the dynamic equation and its ﬁxed point equal:
Bt+1=°bffwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt)+µAT [1¡(Fht+Fmt)]+(1+r)Btg; (35)bB¤(Fht+Fmt)= °b
1¡°b(1+r)ffwm((FhFm)hm)(Fht+Fmt)+µAT [1¡(Fht+Fmt)]g; (36)
where bB¤(Fht+Fmt) is an increasing function.
When Fht
Fmt
2((Fh
Fm
)ml;µ;(
Fh
Fm
)hm), if Pt=P (Fht;Fmt;Bt)·µ, they equal:
Bt+1=
°b
1¡°B f[AM(Fht)
®(Fmt)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)]+(1+r)Btg; (37)
B¤(Fht;Fmt)=
°b
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)fAM(Fht)
®(Fmt)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)g; (38)
where B¤(Fht;Fmt) is an increasing function. If P (Fht;Fmt;Bt)>µ (thus Pt=µ), they are:
Bt+1=°bfAM(Fht)®(Fmt)1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)+µAT (1¡Fht¡Fmt)+(1+r)Btg; (39)
B¤(Fht;Fmt)=
°b
1¡°b(1+r)fAM(Fht)
®(Fmt)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFht+emFmt)+µAT (1¡Fht¡Fmt)g; (40)
where B¤(Fht;Fmt) is an increasing function since fwht>gwmt>wlt=µAT .
When Fht
Fmt
· (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
°B
1¡°B (1+r)Bt < µAT , and Fht < F
y
h(Bt), if Fmt < Á(Fht;Bt)Fht, the
equations are (37) and (38) above. If Fmt¸Á(Fht;Bt)Fht, the dynamic equation is:
Bt+1=
°b
1¡°B
©£
AM(Á(Fht;Bt))
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Á(Fht;Bt)em)
¤
Fht+(1+r)Bt
ª
: (41)
The next lemma shows that, given Fht, Bt converges monotonically to the unique ﬁxed
point of (41), B
¤
(Fht), and B
¤
(Fht) increases and Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) decreases with Fht.
Lemma A3When the dynamics of Bt follow (41); given Fht, Bt converges monotonically
to unique B
¤
(Fht), which is a solution to
B
¤
(Fht)=
°b
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)fAM(Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)))
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Á(Fht;B¤(Fht))em)Fhtg; (42)
and when Bt<(>)B
¤
(Fht), Bt+1>(<)Bt. B
¤
(Fht) is increasing and Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) is decreas-
ing in Fht and limFht!0 Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht))=Á(0)´ limFht!0 Á(Fht;0).
When Fht
Fmt
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and either
°B
1¡°B (1+r)Bt<µAT and Fht¸F
y
h(Bt) or
°B
1¡°B (1+r)Bt¸µAT ,
Bt+1=°bffwh((FhFm)ml;µ)Fht+µAT (1¡Fht)+(1+r)Btg; (43)
B
¤
(Fht)=
°b
1¡°b(1+r)ffwh((FhFm)ml;µ)Fht+µAT (1¡Fht)g; (44)
where B
¤
(Fht) is an increasing function.
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A.4 Welfare, output, and sectoral composition in steady states
The next proposition examines the steady states in terms of welfare, output, and sectoral
composition, based on Propositions A1 and A2 and Proposition 3 of Section 4.1.
Proposition A3 (Welfare, output, and sectoral composition in steady states)
(i) Aggregate net income and average utility are highest in Steady state 1. They increase with
Fh in Steady states 2 and 3, and with Fh and Fm in Steady state 4. Their maxima in
Steady states 2 and 3 are strictly higher than the ones in Steady state 4, and the inﬁnima
in Steady state 2 are strictly higher than the ones in Steady states 3 and 4.
(ii) The same result as (i) holds for aggregate output; except that the magnitude relation
of the maxima in Steady states 3 and 4 is unclear. In Steady state 1, YM
Y
= CBM
PCB
= 1.
In Steady state 2, if Fh < F
y
h,
YM
Y
increases (decreases) with Fh
Fm
= [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1 for
[Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1 >(<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
, where ®
1¡®
em
eh
> fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi ; if Fh ¸ F yh and Fh1¡Fh ·
(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ,
YM
Y
and CBM
PCB
increase with Fh; otherwise,
YM
Y
= CBM
PCB
=1. In Steady state 3, YM
Y
is constant. In Steady state 4, YM
Y
increases (decreases) with Fh
Fm
for Fh
Fm
>(<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
:29
The proposition proves that Steady state 1 is the best in terms of aggregate net income,
average utility, and aggregate output. Other steady states cannot be ranked deﬁnitely, but
if they are to be ranked, Steady state 2 is the second best, Steady state 3 follows, and Steady
state 4 is the worst: the maximum values of these variables in Steady states 2 and 3 (except
aggregate output in Steady state 3) are strictly higher than the ones in Steady state 4, and
the inﬁnima in Steady state 2 are strictly higher than the ones in Steady states 3 and 4.
The three variables increase with the proportion(s) of those accessible to education for jobs
with higher net wages, i.e. Fh in Steady states 2 and 3, and Fh and Fm in Steady state 4.
As for shares of the modern sector in production and in basic consumption, when P <µ
(thus CBM
PCB
= 0), YM
Y
depends on Fh
Fm
and the relation can be non-monotonic: in the case
Fh < F
y
h of Steady state 2 and in Steady state 4,
YM
Y
decreases with Fh
Fm
for Fh
Fm
< ®
1¡®
em
eh
(note ®
1¡®
em
eh
> fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi) and the relation turns positive for FhFm > ®1¡® emeh if ®1¡® emeh <fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi: That is, the production share decreases with FhFm when FhFm is relatively low.
By contrast, when P = µ; i.e. in the case Fh¸F yh and Fh1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ of Steady state 2,
YM
Y
and CBM
PCB
increase with Fh. (They equal 1 in Steady state 1 and in the case
Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ
of Steady state 2; YM
Y
(<1) is constant and CBM
PCB
=0 in Steady state 3.)
29CBM = 0 in the case Fh<F
y
h of Steady state 2 and in Steady states 3 and 4.
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A.5 Relationship between initial conditions and steady states
The next proposition presents the relationship between initial conditions and steady states.
Since the proof of the proposition requires the lengthy and complicated analysis of the
dynamics, the proof is provided in a separate appendix posted on the author’s website.30
Proposition A4 (Initial conditions and steady states)
(i)When Fh0
Fm0
<fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi
a: If Fh0<F
[
h; Fht is constant, Fmt falls, and the economy most likely converges to Steady
state 4.31
b: If Fh0¸F [h; when Fh0¸F [h(B0), Fht is constant, Fmt increases, and the economy converges
to Steady state 2.32 When Fh0<F
[
h(B0), at ﬁrst, Fht is constant and Fmt decreases, and
it could converge to any type of steady states or cycle.33
(ii)When Fh0
Fm0
2
hfwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi;fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehii
a: If b¤(wl)· em at (Fh;Fm;B) = (Fh0;Fm0;B¤(Fh0;Fm0)), Fht and Fmt are constant and the
ﬁnal state is Steady state 4.
b: Otherwise, Fht is constant, Fmt rises, and the economy converges to Steady state 2.
(iii)When Fh0
Fm0
>fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi ; Fht increases and Fht+Fmt non-decreases at ﬁrst.
a: If Fh0
Fm0
¸(Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl)·em at (Fh;Fm) = (Fh0;Fm0) and B = bB¤(Fh0+Fm0), Fht+Fmt
is constant and the economy converges to Steady state 3.
b: If Fh0
Fm0
< (Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl) · em at (Fh;Fm) = (Fh0;Fm0) and B = B¤(Fh0;Fm0), the
following three scenarios are possible depending on details of the initial distribution.
1: The more likely is the same scenario as a:
2: Fht+Fmt rises from the start or after some period and the ﬁnal state is Steady state 1.
3: After Fht+Fmt increases for a while, Fht becomes constant, Fmt increases, and the
economy converges to Steady state 2.
The ﬁrst scenario is more likely as Fh0 and Fm0 are lower, and the second one is more
likely than the third one as Fh0
Fm0
is higher.
c: Otherwise, the same scenarios as 2: and 3: of b: are possible.
30The address is http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/˜yuki/english.html.
31 Fmt could ”jump over” the region FhFm 2
hgwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi;gwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehiidepending on the initial
distribution, in which case it converges to another type of steady states, particularly Steady state 3.
32The exception is when Fh0=F [h and B0=B
¤
(Fh0), in which case both Fmt and Bt are constant.
33The economy possibly cycles between the region FhFm <gwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi and Fh 2 [F [h; F [h(B)) and the
region FhFm 2
hgwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi ;gwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehii.
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Appendix B: Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Lemma A1. (Existence of function Á(¢)) Let Á= Fm
Fh
. Then, from (13) and (16),fwm( FhFm )=P (Fh;Fm;B)AT is expressed as:
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B
AM(Á)
1¡®Fh+(1+r)[B¡(eh+Áem)Fh]
1¡(1+Á)Fh ; (45)
where Fh<
1
1+Á
, Á< 1¡Fh
Fh
must be true. When Fh!0, the equation becomes:
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B (1+r)B; (46)
whose solution Á=Á(B) ´
·
(1¡®)AM
(1+r)

°B
1¡°B B+em
¸
1
®
satisﬁes Á(B)·Á´Á(0)=
h
(1¡®)AM
(1+r)em
i 1
®
, where
Á is the solution to fwm=(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em=0. The LHS of (45) decreases and the RHS
increases with Á for Á<minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág; as Á!0, LHS!+1 and thus LHS>RHS; and as
Á!minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág, LHS<RHS because, when Á=Á< 1¡Fh
Fh
, LHS=0 and RHS>0 (since,
from Á> [(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ]
¡1> [(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1, fwh>fwm=0 and thus AM(Á)1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)=fwh+Áfwm>0
at Á=Á), and when 1¡Fh
Fh
·Á, RHS!+1 as Á! 1¡Fh
Fh
. Hence, for given Fh > 0 and B, a
unique Á2(0;minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág) satisfying the equation exists, which is denoted as Á=Á(Fh; B)
and limFh!0 Á(Fh;B)=Á(B).
(Properties of Á(¢)) The RHS of (45) is strictly increasing in Fh (< 11+Á) when Á 2
[[(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1;minf1¡Fh
Fh
; Ág), because AM(Á)1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)=fwh+Áfwm> (1+Á)µAT >0 at
Á=[(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1 from Assumption 1. Thus, Á(Fh;B) is a decreasing function. Á(B)> [(FhFm)hm]
¡1
because fwm > µAT at Á = [(FhFm)hm]¡1 from Assumption 1 and fwm = °B1¡°B (1+r)B < µAT at
Á = Á(B) from (46). Then, since limFh!0 Á(Fh;B) = Á(B) > [(
Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1 and the limit of
Á(Fh;B) when Fh! 1
1+[(
Fh
Fm
)hm]¡1
is strictly less than [(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1 (from eq. 45), for given B,
there exists a unique Fh > 0 satisfying Á(Fh;B)=[(
Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1, which is denoted as F zh(B). The
existence of F yh(B) can be proved similarly. F
z
h(B)>F
y
h(B) is from Assumption 1.
Proof of Lemma A2. As shown in the proof of Lemma A1, Á(0) ¸ Á(B) > [(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1,fwm¸ (>)0 for FhFm ¸ (>)[Á(0)]¡1, and, from the deﬁnition of (FhFm)hm, fwh¸ (>)fwm for FhFm ·
(<)(Fh
Fm
)hm. Hence, the numerator of (16) and thus P (Fh;Fm;B) are increasing in Fh and Fm
for Fh
Fm
2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)hm].
From (16) and Á= Fm
Fh
, P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ is expressed as:
1
AT
°B
1¡°B
AM(Á)
1¡®Fh+(1+r)[B¡(eh+Áem)Fh]
1¡(1+Á)Fh =µ; (47)
where Fh <
1
1+Á
, Á < 1¡Fh
Fh
. For given Á 2 [[(Fh
Fm
)hm]
¡1;Á(0)], when Fh = 0, LHS =
1
AT
°B
1¡°B (1+r)B < µ; when Fh! 11+Á , LHS! +1; and the LHS is increasing in Fh (since
AM(Á)
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)=fwh+Áfwm>0). Hence, given B, for any FhFm 2 [[Á(0)]¡1;(FhFm)hm],
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there exists a unique Fh 2 (0; 1
1+[
Fh
Fm
]¡1
) satisfying P (Fh;[
Fh
Fm
]¡1Fh;B) = P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ.
When Fh
Fm
>(<)(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and thus fwm( FhFm )>(<)µAT , at P (Fh;Fm;B)=µ; fwm( FhFm )>(<)µAT =
P (Fh;Fm;B)AT , that is, Fm<(>)Á(Fh;B)Fh.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since Fh>0, an equilibrium satisfying Lh, Lm>0 always exists
from the shape of the sector M production function. Thus, equilibrium Lh and Lm must
satisfy fwh¸ fwm (thus LhLm · (FhFm)hm) and fwm¸wl. Since fwh= fwm>µAT ¸wl at LhLm =(FhFm)hm
(from Assumption 1) and fwh(fwm) is decreasing (increasing) in LhLm , there does not exist
equilibrium Lh
Lm
satisfying fwh = fwm = wl. Hence, when fwh = fwm, fwm > wl, while whenfwm = wl, fwh > fwm in equilibrium. In the former case, Lh · Fh, Lh+Lm = Fh+Fm, and
Lh
Lm
= Lh
Fh+Fm¡Lh ·
Fh
Fm
, and in the latter case, Lh=Fh, Lm·Fm, and LhLm = FhLm ¸ FhFm .
(i) fwm = wl is not possible since fwh > fwm and LhLm = FhLm ¸ FhFm ¸ (FhFm)hm cannot hold
together. Thus, fwm>wl, Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm and LhLm = LhFh+Fm¡Lh · FhFm . When FhFm =(FhFm)hm,fwh> fwm with Lh<Fh (since LhLm < FhFm = (FhFm)hm) and thus Lh=Fh, Lm=Fm, and fwh= fwm
in equilibrium. When Fh
Fm
> (Fh
Fm
)hm, fwh< fwm with Lh=Fh and thus Lh<Fh and fwh= fwm in
equilibrium. Values of Lh and Lm are obtained from
Lh
Lm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm.
(ii) If fwh=fwm, as shown above, LhLm = LhFh+Fm¡Lh · FhFmmust hold, which implies LhLm · FhFm <
(Fh
Fm
)hm and thus fwh>fwm, a contradiction. Hence, fwh>fwm and Lh=Fh in equilibrium.
When °B
1¡°B (1+r)B¸µAT , the RHS of (16) is greater than µ for any equilibrium Lh and Lm
(since ewi>0), thus P =µ and wl=µAT in equilibrium. Hence, when FhFm 2 ((FhFm)ml;µ;(FhFm)hm),fwm>wl and Lm=Fm, and when FhFm ·(FhFm)ml;µ, fwm=wl and LhLm = FhLm =(FhFm)ml;µ.
When °B
1¡°B (1+ r)B < µAT , since
Fh
Fm
< (Fh
Fm
)hm, from Lemma A1, Fh and Fm satisfy-
ing fwm( FhFm ) = P (Fh;Fm;B)AT exist for any FhFm ¸ [Á(B)]¡1 and is expressed as Fm =
Á(Fh;B)Fh, where Á(Fh;B) is a decreasing function, and from Lemma A2, Fh and Fm sat-
isfying P (Fh;Fm;B) = µ exist for any
Fh
Fm
¸ [Á(0)]¡1, where P (Fh;Fm;B) is an increasing
function. Note that (Fh
Fm
)ml;µ> [Á(B)]
¡1¸ [Á(0)]¡1 from (45) and (46) in the proof of Lemma
A1 and °B
1¡°B (1+r)B<µAT .
(a) When P (Fh;Fm;B)<µ, fwm( FhFm )>µAT >P (Fh;Fm;B)AT from FhFm > (FhFm)ml;µ. Hence,
Lm = Fm and fwm > µAT > wl = P (Fh;Fm;B)AT in equilibrium. When P (Fh;Fm;B) ¸ µ,fwm = fwm( FhLm ) = P (Fh;Lm;B)AT = wl ¸ fwm( FhFm ) cannot be true since fwm( FhFm ) > µAT from
Fh
Fm
>(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ. Hence, fwm>wl, Lm=Fm, and P =µ in equilibrium.
(b) 1. From Lemma A1 (see Figure 9 too), for any Fh
Fm
2 [ [Á(B)]¡1;(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ), there exists
Fh < F
y
h(B) satisfying Fm = Á(Fh;B)Fh. When P (Fh;Fm;B) ¸ µ (then, Fm > Á(Fh;B)Fh
from Lemma A2) or when P (Fh;Fm;B)<µ and Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwm( FhFm )·P (Fh;Fm;B)AT
and thus fwm = fwm( FhLm ) = P (Fh;Lm;B)AT =wl and Lm = Á(Fh;B)Fh in equilibrium, wherefwm = fwm( FhLm )< µAT from FhLm = 1Á(Fh;B) < 1Á(F yh(B);B) = (FhFm)ml;µ. When P (Fh;Fm;B)< µ and
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Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh, fwm=fwm( FhFm )>P (Fh;Fm;B)AT =wl and Lm=Fm in equilibrium.
2. When Fh
Fm
·(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ and Fh¸F yh(B), from Lemma A2 (see Figure 1 too), P (Fh;Fm;B)=
P (Fh;[
Fh
Fm
]¡1Fh;B) ¸ P (Fh;[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh;B) ¸ P (F
y
h(B);[(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ]
¡1F yh(B);B) = µ. From
Lemma A2, when P (Fh;Fm;B)¸µ, Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh and thus fwm( FhFm )·µAT ·P (Fh;Fm;B)AT .
Hence, fwm= µAT =wl, P = µ, Lm=[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1Fh, and fwh=fwh([(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1) in equilibrium.
Note that fwm=wl=P (Fh;Lm;B)AT <µAT (thus LhLm = FhLm >(FhFm)ml;µ) is not possible because,
from Lemma A2, if Fh
Lm
>(Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, fwm( FhLm )>P (Fh;Lm;B)AT when P (Fh;Lm;B)<µ.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) From Proposition 1 (i), Lh
Lm
= (Fh
Fm
)hm and thus fwh = fwm =fwm((FhFm)hm), which is strictly greater than µAT (thus wl) from Assumption 1. By substitutingfwh=fwm=fwm((FhFm)hm) and Lh+Lm=Fh+Fm into P (eq. 15) and equating it with µ,
°B
1¡°B
fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)B
1¡(Fh+Fm) =µAT , Fh+Fm=
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)B
°Bfwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT : (48)
Thus, the result for wl holds. (ii) Straightforward from proofs of Proposition 1 (ii).
Proof of Proposition A1. Net aggregate income is computed from Lh, Lm, and wages of
Propositions 1 and 2 and (15), and average utility is from net aggregate income and (15).
(i) When Fh+Fm <
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bh
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT i , NI =
1
1¡°B
hfwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)Bi
and thus it increases with Fh+Fm and B. Average utility equals
(°B)
°B(°N)
°N (°b)
°b
(
°B
1¡°B[fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)B]
AT (1¡Fh¡Fm)
)¡°B
1
1¡ °B
hfwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)Bi
=
(°N)
°N (°b)
°b
(1¡°B)1¡°B [AT (1¡Fh¡Fm)]
°B [fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)B]1¡°B ; (49)
the derivative of which with respect to Fh+Fm equals the average utility times
¡ °B
1¡Fh¡Fm+
(1¡°B)fwm((FhFm)hm)fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)B =
fwm((FhFm)hm)(1¡°B¡Fh¡Fm)¡°B(1+r)B
(1¡Fh¡Fm)[fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)B] ; (50)
where, from Fh+Fm <
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)B
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT , the numerator of the expression is greater
than
[(1¡°B)fwm((FhFm)hm)¡°B(1+r)B][°Bfwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT ]¡fwm((FhFm)hm)[(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)B]
°Bfwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT
=
[fwm((FhFm)hm)¡µAT ]°B(1¡°B)[fwm((FhFm)hm)+(1+r)B]
°Bfwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT > 0: (51)
Hence the average utility too increases with Fh+Fm andB. When Fh+Fm¸ (1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)B
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT ,
NI=fwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+µAT (1¡Fh¡Fm)+(1+r)B and average utility equals °B°B°N°N°b°b(µ)¡°BNI.
Thus, they increase with Fh+Fm and B.
(ii) (a) When P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ, NI= 11¡°B[AM(Fh)®(Fm)1¡®+(1+r)(B¡ehFh¡emFm)] and
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thus it increases with Fh; Fm; and B. Average utility equals
(°N)
°N (°b)
°b
(1¡°B)1¡°B [AT (1¡Fh¡Fm)]
°B
£
AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®+(1+r)(B¡ehFh¡emFm)
¤1¡°B ; (52)
the derivative of which with respect to Fi(i=h;m) equals the average utility times
¡ °B
1¡Fh¡Fm+
(1¡°B) ewi( FhFm )
AM(Fh)®(Fm)1¡®+(1+r)(B¡ehFh¡emFm)¸
°B
1¡Fh¡Fm [¡1+
ewi( FhFm )
µAT
] >0; (53)
where the ﬁrst inequality is from P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ , °B1¡°B
AM (Fh)
®(Fm)1¡®+(1+r)(B¡ehFh¡emFm)
AT [1¡Fh¡Fm] ·
µ. Hence, the average utility too increases with Fh; Fm; and B. When P (Fh;Fm;B)>µ and
thus P = µ; NI =AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®+(1+r)(B¡ehFh¡emFm)+µAT (1¡Fh¡Fm) and average
utility equals (°B)
°B(°N)
°N (°b)
°b(µ)¡°BNI. Thus, they increase with Fh; Fm; and B.
(b) 1. When Fm¸Á(Fh;B)Fh, NI=fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)Fh+fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)(1¡Fh)+(1+r)B.
The derivative of NI with respect to Fh equals
fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)¡ fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)¡fwh0([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)Fh+fwm0([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)(1¡Fh)
[Á(Fh;B)]2
@Á
@Fh
; (54)
where fwh0([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)Fh+fwm0([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)(1¡Fh)=®(1¡®)AM¡[Á(Fh;B)]¡1¢®¡1[1¡Fh¡Á(Fh;B)Fh]>0
(55)
and thus the derivative is positive. Similarly, the derivative of NI with respect to B equals
¡ £fwh0([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)Fh+fwm0([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)(1¡Fh)¤[Á(Fh;B)]¡2 @Á@B+(1+r) > 0:
Since P = gwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)
AT
, average utility equals
(°BAT)
°B°N
°N°b
°b
£fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)¤¡°B©fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)Fh+fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)(1¡Fh)+(1+r)Bª:
(56)
The derivative with respect to Fh equals the average utility times
¡
·
¡°B fwm0([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1) + fwh
0([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)Fh+fwm0([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)(1¡Fh)fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)Fh+fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)(1¡Fh)+(1+r)B [¸Á(Fh;B)]¡2 @Á@Fh
+
fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)¡fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)fwh([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)Fh+fwm([Á(Fh;B)]¡1)(1¡Fh)+(1+r)B; (57)
where the expression inside the big square bracket of the ﬁrst term equals (Á ´ Á(Fh;B))
1gwm(Á¡1)[fwh(Á¡1)Fh+gwm([Á¡1)(1¡Fh)+(1+r)B] times
¡ °Bfwm0(Á¡1) £fwh(Á¡1)Fh+fwm(Á¡1)(1¡Fh)+(1+r)B¤+ fwm(Á¡1) £fwh0(Á¡1)Fh+fwm0(Á¡1)(1¡Fh)¤
= ¡fwm0(Á¡1) [1¡(1+Á)Fh] fwm(Á¡1) + £fwh0(Á¡1)Fh+fwm0(Á¡1)(1¡Fh)¤ fwm(Á¡1) (from eq. 14)
= [fwh0(Á¡1)+fwm0(Á¡1)Á]Fhfwm(Á¡1) = 0:
Hence, the derivative is positive. The derivative with respect to B can be proved to be
positive similarly. When Fm<Á(Fh;B)Fh; the proof of (ii)(a) when P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ applies.
2. NI=fwh((FhFm)ml;µ)Fh+µAT (1¡Fh)+(1+r)B and average utility equals °B°B°N°N°b°b(µ)¡°BNI.
Thus, they increase with Fh and B.
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Proof of Proposition A2. Y and YM are computed from equilibrium Lh and Lm (Propo-
sition 1), (6), and (16). Since PCB = °BNI and CBM = °BNI¡µAT [1¡(Lh+Lm)] (eq. 17),
the result on CBM
PCB
=°B¡µAT 1¡(Lh+Lm)NI is obtained from Propositions 1 and A1.
(i) When Fh+Fm<
(1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)Bh
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT i ,
Y =AM
((
Fh
Fm
)hm)
®
1+(
Fh
Fm
)hm
(Fh+Fm)+
°B
1¡°B
hfwm((FhFm)hm)(Fh+Fm)+(1+r)Bi : Thus, Y increases with
Fh+Fm and B; and
YM
Y
increases with Fh+Fm
B
. When Fh+Fm ¸ (1¡°B)µAT¡°B(1+r)B
°Bgwm((FhFm)hm)+(1¡°B)µAT ,
Y =AM
((
Fh
Fm
)hm)
®
1+(
Fh
Fm
)hm
(Fh+Fm)+µAT (1¡Fh¡Fm), where the ﬁrst term is YM . Thus, Y and YMY
increase with Fh+Fm.
CBM
PCB
=°B¡µAT 1¡(Fh+Fm)NI and thus it increases with Fh+Fm and B.
(ii)(a) When P (Fh;Fm;B)·µ, Y =AM(Fh)®(Fm)1¡®+ °B1¡°B [AM(Fh)®(Fm)1¡®+(1+r)(B¡ehFh¡emFm)],
where the ﬁrst term is YM : Thus, Y increases with Fh; Fm; and B; and
YM
Y
increases
with Fh and Fm and decreases with B. When P (Fh;Fm;B) > µ and thus P = µ; Y =
AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®+µAT (1¡Fh¡Fm), where the ﬁrst term is YM . Thus, Y and YMY increase
with Fh and Fm.
CBM
PCB
=°B¡µAT 1¡(Fh+Fm)NI and thus it increases with Fh; Fm; and B.
(b) 1. Y =AM(Á(Fh;B))
1¡®Fh+
°B
1¡°B fAM(Á(Fh;B))1¡®Fh+(1+r)[B¡(eh+Á(Fh;B)em)Fh]g ;
where the ﬁrst term is YM : The derivative of Y with respect to Fh equals (Á ´ Á(Fh;B))
1
1¡°B [AM(Á)
1¡®¡°B(1+r)(eh+Áem)]+ 1
1¡°B [(1¡®)AM(Á)
¡®¡°B(1+r)em]Fh @Á
@Fh
=
1
1¡°B [(1¡®)AM(Á)
¡®¡°B(1+r)em](Á+Fh @Á
@Fh
)+
1
1¡°B [®AM(Á)
1¡®¡°B(1+r)eh]
>
1
1¡°B [fwm(Á¡1)(Á+Fh @Á@Fh )+fwh(Á¡1)]: (58)
In the above equation, from (1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B1¡°B
AM (Á)
1¡®Fh+(1+r)[B¡(eh+Áem)Fh]
1¡(1+Á)Fh (eq.
45 in the proof of Lemma A1),
@Á
@Fh
= ¡ (1+Á) [(1¡®)AM(Á)
¡®¡(1+r)em]+ °B1¡°B [AM(Á)1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)]
1
1¡°B [(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em]Fh+[®(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡1] [1¡(1+Á)Fh]
= ¡ (1+Á)fwm(Á¡1)+ °B1¡°B [fwh(Á¡1)+Áfwm(Á¡1)]1
1¡°B fwm(Á¡1)Fh+[®(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡1] [1¡(1+Á)Fh] : (59)fwm(Á¡1)(Á+Fh @Á@Fh )+fwh(Á¡1) in (58) thus equals 1gwm(Á¡1)Fh
1¡°B +[®(1¡®)AM (Á)
¡®¡1][1¡(1+Á)Fh]
times£fwh(Á¡1)+Áfwm(Á¡1)¤n 11¡°B fwm(Á¡1)Fh+£®(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡1¤ [1¡(1+Á)Fh]o
¡
n
(1+Á)fwm(Á¡1)+ °B1¡°B £fwh(Á¡1)+Áfwm(Á¡1)¤o fwm(Á¡1)Fh
=
£fwh(Á¡1)+Áfwm(Á¡1)¤©fwm(Á¡1)Fh+£®(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡1¤[1¡(1+Á)Fh]ª¡(1+Á)fwm(Á¡1)fwm(Á¡1)Fh
=
£fwh(Á¡1)+Áfwm(Á¡1)¤®(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡1[1¡(1+Á)Fh]+(fwh(Á¡1)¡fwm(Á¡1))fwm(Á¡1)Fh > 0:
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The derivative of Y with respect to B equals
°B(1+r)
1¡°B +
1
1¡°B [(1¡®)AMÁ
¡®¡°B(1+r)em]Fh @Á
@B
>
1
1¡°B
·fwm(Á¡1)Fh @Á
@B
+°B(1+r)
¸
: (60)
In the above equation, from (1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B1¡°B
AM (Á)
1¡®Fh+(1+r)[B¡(eh+Áem)Fh]
1¡(1+Á)Fh ;
@Á
@B
= ¡
°B
1¡°B (1+r)
1
1¡°B fwm(Á¡1)Fh+[®(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡1] [1¡(1+Á)Fh] : (61)
Thus,
fwm(Á¡1)Fh @Á
@B
+°B(1+r)=
°B(1+r)
1¡°B
°B
1¡°B fwm(Á¡1)Fh+[®(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡1][1¡(1+Á)Fh]
1
1¡°B fwm(Á¡1)Fh+[®(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡1][1¡(1+Á)Fh]>0: (62)
Hence, Y increases with Fh and B: Since
YM
Y
=
³
1+ °B
1¡°B
n
1+(1+r)B¡(eh+Á(Fh;B)em)Fh
AM (Á(Fh;B))1¡®Fh
o´ ¡1
; YM
Y
decreases with B; but the eﬀect of Fh is ambiguous.
2. Y =AM [(
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ]
®¡1Fh+µAT (1¡f1+[(FhFm)ml;µ]g¡1Fh). Thus, Y and YMY increase with
Fh.
CBM
PCB
=°B¡ µATNI (1¡f1+[(FhFm)ml;µ]g¡1Fh), which increases with Fh and B.
Proof of Lemma A3. From the proof of Lemma A2, Á=Á(Fht;Bt) is a solution to
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B
[AM(Á)
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)]Fht+(1+r)Bt
1¡(1+Á)Fht . (63)
where the ﬁrst term of the numerator of the RHS equals fwht+Ágwmt > 0 from (12) and
(13).Since the LHS decreases with Á and the RHS and the denominator of the RHS increase
with Á, the numerator of the RHS increases with Bt. Thus, the numerator of the RHS of
(41) is positive at Bt=0 and is increasing in Bt. Further, for any Bt>0,
@RHS
@Bt
= °b
1¡°B
n£
(1¡®)AM(Á(Fht;Bt))¡®¡(1+r)em
¤
Fht
@Á(Fht;Bt)
@Bt
+(1+r)
o
< °b(1+r)
1¡°B <1: (64)
Hence, for given Fht, Bt converges monotonically to the unique solution to (42), B
¤
(Fht), and
when Bt<(>)B
¤
(Fht), Bt+1>(<)Bt. From (63) and (42), Á=Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) is a solution to:
(1¡®)AM(Á)¡®¡(1+r)em= °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
AM(Á)
1¡®¡(1+r)(eh+Áem)
1¡(1+Á)Fht Fht: (65)
Thus, Á(Fht;B
¤
(Fht)) is decreasing in Fht and, as Fht!0, Á(Fht;B¤(Fht))!Á(0)´
h
(1¡®)AM
(1+r)em
i 1
®
.
Finally, dB
¤
(Fht)
dFht
>0 is from (28) and Proposition A1 (ii)(b) 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. When the economy is in a steady state, relative positions of the
critical loci determining the dynamics of Fh and Fm and the magnitude relation of P and
µ are illustrated by Figure 5. In the region satisfying b¤(fwm)> eh and b¤(wl)> em of the
ﬁgure, Fh and Fh+Fm increase when Fh< 1, thus Fh< 1 cannot be a steady state. Hence,
(Fh;Fm) = (1;0) is the only steady state (Steady state 1). Since
Fh
Fm
= +1 > (Fh
Fm
)hm and
P = µ from the ﬁgure, B = bB¤(1) holds from (36). In the region satisfying b¤(fwm) · eh
38
and b¤(wl) > em, Fh is constant and Fm increases when Fh+Fm < 1, thus steady states
are such that Fm = 1¡Fh and Fh satisﬁes b¤(fwm) · eh , FhFm = Fh1¡Fh · fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi
(from the paragraph just after Assumption 3) and b¤(wl) > em , Fh > F [h (from eq. 32)
[Steady state 2]. Since Lm =maxfÁ(Fh; B¤(Fh));[(FhFm)ml;µ]¡1gFh when FhFm = Fh1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ
and Lm = Fm when
Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ from Proposition 1, B = B
¤
(Fh) when
Fh
1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ
from (42) and (44), and B = B¤(Fh;Fm) when Fh1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ from P = µ and (40). In
the region satisfying b¤(fwm) > eh and b¤(wl) · em, Fh increases and Fm decreases when
Fm > 0, thus steady states are such that Fm = 0 and Fh satisﬁes b
¤(wl) · em , Fh ·
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
gwm((FhFm)hm)+ 1¡°b(1+r)°b em (from eq. 30) [Steady state 3]. Since P <µ from the ﬁgure,
B = bB¤(Fh) holds from (34). In the region satisfying b¤(fwm) · eh and b¤(wl) · em, Fh
is constant and Fm decreases (is constant) when b
¤(fwm) < (¸)em, thus steady states are:
Fh and Fm satisfying em · b¤(fwm) · eh , FhFm 2 hfwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi;fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehii and
b¤(wl)·em,P (Fh;Fm;B¤(Fh;Fm))AT · 1¡°b(1+r)°b em (from eq. 31), and B = B¤(Fh;Fm) (from
eq. 38) [Steady state 4]; and Fh = F
[
h; Fm ¸ Á(F [h;B
¤
(F [h))F
[
h (thus
Fh
Fm
< fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi);
and B=B
¤
(Fh) (see footnote 22).
In Steady state 2, from the ﬁgure and the result on B, P =P (Fh;Lm;B
¤
(Fh))<µ if Fh·F yh
and P =µ otherwise. In Steady state 3, P =P (Lh;Lm; bB¤(Fh))= °B1¡°B¡°b(1+r) gwm((FhFm)hm)FhAT (1¡Fh) from
(16), (34), and fwh = fwm = fwm((FhFm)hm). Levels of Lh, Lm, and Ll; and wages are from
Propositions 1 and 2 and the result on P .
Proof of Proposition A3. (i) From Proposition A1 (i), aggregate net income (NI) and
average utility of Steady state 1 are strictly greater than those of Steady state 3, and they
increase with Fh in Steady state 3 (B = bB¤(Fh) from Proposition 3 3.). In Steady state
2, when Fh
1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, NI and average utility increase with Fh from Propositions A1
(ii)(b) and 3 2. a. (B = B
¤
(Fh)), while when
Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, they increase with Fh because
NI= 1
1¡°b(1+r)fAM(Fh)®(1¡Fh)1¡®¡(1+r)[ehFh+em(1¡Fh)]g (note fwh>fwm) and average utility
equals a constant times NI from the proof of Proposition A1 (ii)(a), Proposition 3 2. b.
(Fm = 1¡Fh, B = B¤(Fh;Fm); and P = µ), and (40). Since NI and average utility of
Steady state 1 equal those when Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and Fm = 1¡Fh, and the above proof of their
being increasing in Fh when
Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ applies when
Fh
1¡Fh 2
³fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi;(FhFm)hmi
as well, these variables of Steady state 2 are strictly small than those of Steady state 1.
In Steady state 4, they increase with Fh and Fm from Propositions A1 (ii)(a) and 3 4.
(B=B¤(Fh;Fm)). In Steady state 4, they are highest when b¤(fwm)= eh and b¤(wl)= em,
P (Fh;Fm;B
¤(Fh;Fm))AT =
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
em; because they are highest on b
¤(wl)= em from Figure
5 and increase with Fh among steady states on the locus from (29) and the expressions
39
for these variables in the proof of Proposition A1 (ii)(a). (Note that the absolute value of
the slope of the locus is less than 1.) The highest NI and average utility of Steady state
4 are strictly lower than those of Steady state 3, since the latter coincide with those when
Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and b
¤(wl)=em. They are also strictly lower than those of Steady state 2, since
they are highest at b¤(fwm)= eh in both types of steady states. They are at the inﬁnimum
when Fh ! 0 in Steady states 3, and when FhFm = fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi and Fh ! 0 in Steady
states 4, hence the inﬁnima equal 0. The inﬁnima of Steady state 2 are strictly higher than
the ones in Steady states 3 and 4, since the former coincide with the NI and average utility
at the intersection of b¤(fwm)=em and b¤(wl)=em of Steady state 4.
(ii) In Steady state 3, Y increases with Fh from Propositions A2 (i) and 3 3. (B =bB¤(Fh)), and YMY is constant from the proof of Proposition A2 (i) and (34). Y is strictly
lower than Y of Steady state 1, since Y increases with Fh when b
¤(wl)>em too. In Steady
state 2, when Fh<F
y
h , Y increases with Fh from Propositions A2 (ii)(b) 1. and 3 2. a. (B
= B
¤
(Fh)). From the proof of Proposition A2 (ii)(b) 1. and (42), Y =AM(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))
1¡®Fh+
°B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
h
AM(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))
1¡®Fh¡(1+r)(eh+Á(Fh;B¤(Fh))em)Fh
i
(the ﬁrst term is YM):Hence,
YM
Y
=
n
1+ °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
h
1¡ 1+r
AM
³
eh
(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))1¡®
+em(Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh)))
®´
io¡1
and YM
Y
increases (de-
creases) with [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1 for [Á(Fh;B
¤
(Fh))]
¡1>(<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
, where ®
1¡®
em
eh
>fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi
can be proved as follows. First, Assumption 2 implies ®AM((
Fh
Fm
)hm)
¡(1¡®)> eh
°b
,®AM(FhFm)¡(1¡®)¡
(1+r)eh<(1¡®)AM(FhFm)®¡(1+r)em at FhFm =(
°b®AM
eh
)
1
1¡®,AM®®(1¡®)1¡®> e
®
h
°b
[eh¡°b(1+r)(eh¡em)]1¡®:
Then, the last equation proves ®
1¡®
em
eh
> fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b emi, °b(1¡®)AM( ®1¡® emeh )® > em ,
AM®
®(1¡®)1¡®> e®he1¡®m
°b
. When Fh¸F yh and Fh1¡Fh · (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ, Y ,
YM
Y
; and CBM
PCB
increase with
Fh from Propositions A2 (ii)(b) 2. and 3 2. a. (B = B
¤
(Fh)). When
Fh
1¡Fh > (
Fh
Fm
)ml;µ; Y in-
creases with Fh from Proposition 3 2. b. (Fm = 1¡Fh and P =µ) and the proof of Proposition
A2 (ii)(a) (Y =AM(Fh)
®(1¡Fh)1¡®), and YMY =1 and CBMPCB =1 from Proposition 3 2. b. (YT =
0): The highest Y of Steady state 2 (at b¤(fwm)=eh) is strictly lower than Y of Steady state 1,
because the latter coincides with Y when Fh
Fm
=(Fh
Fm
)hm and Fm = 1¡Fh, and the above proof
of Y increasing with Fh applies when
Fh
1¡Fh 2
³fwm¡1h1¡°b(1+r)°b ehi;(FhFm)hmi as well. In Steady
state 4, Y increases with Fh and FM from Propositions A2 (ii)(a) and 3 4. (B=B
¤(Fh;Fm)).
Since Y =AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®+ °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r) [AM(Fh)
®(Fm)
1¡®¡(1+r)(ehFh+emFm)] from the proof
of Proposition A2 (ii)(a) and (38), YM
Y
=
n
1+ °B
1¡°B¡°b(1+r)
h
1¡ 1+r
AM
³
eh(
Fh
Fm
)1¡®+em(FhFm)
¡®´
io¡1
and thus YM
Y
increases (decreases) with Fh
Fm
for Fh
Fm
> (<) ®
1¡®
em
eh
. From Figure 5, for given
Fh
Fm
, Y in this steady state is strictly lower than Y in Steady state 2. Thus, the highest Y
in Steady state 4 is strictly lower than in Steady state 2. The inﬁnimum in Steady state 2
can be proved to be strictly higher than in Steady states 3 and 4 in the same way as (i).
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